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The research focuses on financial aspect of infrastructure investment in Vietnam in term of
applying public private partnership (PPP) models; especially, value for money (VFM). Firstly, the
study describes standard PPP model and explores VFM of this model. Secondly, the research
includes experience in public financial innovation in some countries that reach higher VFM of
reformed PPP models. Finally, it considers PPP models applied in Vietnam to understand VFM of
these models better. This result is basis for Vietnam government to impose suitable policies to
guarantee greater VFM in using PPP models.
Aims and Objectives
On the one hand, the result of the research can help Vietnam government to secure greater
VFM of current PPP models that is determined base on three aspects such as risk transfer,
transaction costs and PPP contribution to socioeconomic development in Vietnam. In which, the
study shows the way for government can improve effectiveness of risk transfer and PPP
contribution, and minimize transaction costs. On the other hand, while Vietnam is piloting the use
of PPP models, the research helps government find out trends that Vietnam should follow for
reaching more effectiveness in applying of these models.
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51. Introduction
 1. 1 Research background
Generally speaking, infrastructure is the total of material, technical, and architectural
facilities that has fundamental roles for guaranteeing socioeconomic activities to take place
normally. It means that infrastructure secures generally necessary conditions for production and
expanded reproduction processes to maintain regularly and continuously. It is clear that
infrastructure is a complex system and spreads over many different fields so there are a lot of
different infrastructure classifications. However, infrastructure is divided into two basis groups such
as economic and social infrastructures (CIEM, 2008, p. 18). Economic infrastructures include
facilities of transport, energy, telecommunication, water supply and etc which have important role
in national economy. They help national economy develop quickly and sustainability for improving
quality of citizen life. Social infrastructures involve facilities of accommodation, school, hospital,
science, culture and etc which serve and improve living standards of communities; train and
develop human resource. What is role of infrastructure to development? In fact, the results of many
researches show that infrastructural development has positive effects on socio-economic
development in both developed and developing countries. César Calderón and Luis Servén
researched into the impacts of infrastructure on growth and income distribution over 100 countries
in the period from 1960 to 2000. The result of this study presents that infrastructure has a
considerable positive effect on long-term economic growth, decreases income inequality and has
most important role in poverty reduction (César Calderón, 2004). Another similar study in some
Asian countries shows that infrastructure has important role in economic growth because
infrastructural development contributes to performance improvement and effectiveness of economy,
and has positive effect on poverty reduction (Naoyuki Yoshino, 2000). In Vietnam, a research of
Pham Thi Tuy mentions that infrastructural development opens possibilities to attract various
investment flows for socioeconomic development. Infrastructure is condition for developing key
economic regions lead to create spill over effects on growth of adjacent areas (Tuy, 2006). In brief,
infrastructure plays especially important role in national growth and is motivation for development.
What has Vietnam done in infrastructural investment?
During 12 recent years, Vietnam has maintained the level of infrastructure investment at
10% of GDP (X. T. Nguyen, 2010) lead to expand volume of infrastructure and contribute to the
success in national growth and development. For example, after the global crisis, infrastructure
investment is one of main factors that helps Vietnam economy recover rapidly and reaches at 6.8
percent GDP in 2010(Bank, 2011). However, there is a paradox that Vietnam invests in
infrastructure at high rate while Vietnam is increasingly faced with weak infrastructure. According
6to the ranking of The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, infrastructure is one of main
factors obstructs the national competition of Vietnam (Schwab, 2010). This has a negative
impact on the country's ability to maintain high economic growth in the long term. This is a an
evidence revealing the weakness of the public sector in investment management in term of
economic efficiency and management skills in Vietnam. In this case, private sector should
participate in developing public facilities to improve effectiveness of infrastructure investment. On
the other hand, financial resources of infrastructure investment are state budget, government bonds,
private, ODA (official development assistance), and others, of which ODA accounts for the largest
percentage, at 37% (Warlters, 2006). In 2009, GDP per capita of Vietnam was 1060$ (Schwab,
2010). It means that Vietnam reaches the level of low average income countries. Therefore,
Vietnam may receive less foreign financial grants, especially ODA and must borrow
commercial loans with high interest rates.  A better solution is that Vietnam should enhance
participation of the private sector as PPP model to compensate for the shortage of capital in
infrastructure investment. Furthermore, New Public Management (NPM) principles stress on using
proven skills of private sector to improve management practices of public sector, reducing public
expenditure and increasing quality of public services (Hood, 1995, pp. 96-97). These principles
encouraged the establishment of PPP model as a new management tool for providing public
services  and  developing  society  in  both  developed  and  developing  countries (Khanom, 2010,
p. 150). In fact, PPP model has a variety of advantages in supplying public services such as
maximizing the use of private skills, transferring knowledge, decreasing public expenditure by
encouraging the injection of private sector capital, delivering budgetary certainly, increasing value
for money of projects, making public projects affordable (Kathryn Eustice, 2005, pp. 17-26). In
case of Vietnam, PPP model application includes almost these reasons. For example, Vietnam
government encourages private investment into fields which have high technology and modern
techniques. Beside that, the government supports the transfers of advanced technologies from
private to public sector (V. N. Assembly, 2005). In addition, Decision 71/2010/QD-TTg of Vietnam
Prime Minister shows that public sector attracts private capital to supply public services through
PPP model (Minister, 2010). This is a way that helps government guarantee enough capital to invest
infrastructure and decrease burden of public debts gradually. However, delivering better value for
money maybe is principal reason why Vietnam uses PPP model. Actually, public investment in
Vietnam is growing, enduring high cost and offering low effectiveness. This is proven in terms of
high level of ICOR (Incremental Capital - Output Rate) indicator. For instance, this indicator was
6.15 in period from 2007 to 2008, reached at 8 in 2009 and reduced 6.2 in 2010. The high levels of
ICOR indicator means that effectiveness of Vietnam public investment is lower than other countries
7in the region (Nga Nguyen Hong, 2011). Therefore, Vietnam government is attracted in using PPP
model to improve effectiveness of public investment through reaching better value for money of
projects. Because of this, Vietnam citizens can gain better quality of public service while
government can drop public expenditures.
Vietnam expects that PPP model contributes into economic growth and improving quality of
citizen life. In May 2011, the government held a seminar on promoting the PPP program between
the Vietnamese government and donors in which Deputy Minister of Planning and Investment Mr.
Dang said that the Vietnam government hoped to successfully implement the PPP program
(VOVNews, 2011). I chose the research topic: “Three main models of public private partnership
projects in Vietnam: an in-depth analysis of value for money” because I hope the result of this study
can help government enhance the effectiveness of PPP model in Vietnam.
1.2 Theoretical framework
The viewpoint of Bergmann showed that PPP was partnership between public and private
sector to supply a public facility and/or public service. PPP transferred a part of risks in public
project from public sector to private sector. Moreover, it seemed a good method that helped public
sector to utilize not only finance but also management way and high technology of private sector.
He gave classifications of PPP including many different levels of apportioned risk between public
and private sector (Bergmann, 2009, 138-143). On the other hand, the New Public Management
(NPM) was a new method to replace old fashion bureaucratic public administration to organize and
to finance public projects and activities. One of NPM features was increasing the use of private
sector management approaches in the public sector (Hood, 1991). Compare with PPP model, this
viewpoint supported for application of this model in public sector. Beside that, since the time of
Adam Smith (the 18th century), economists have argued that resource allocation is most ‘efficient’
when it is arranged through competitive markets to cut costs and to attract customers by improving
the quality of the goods or services. From the 1980s, this analysis was applied in public
sector(Bovaird, 2004). This was another supporting viewpoint about using PPP model.
Transaction cost economics is fundamental theory that considers whether PPP projects can
achieve value for money. The first concept of transaction cost was mentioned by Ronald Coase in
the famous article “The Nature of Firm” in 1937. After that, Oliver E. Williamson has developed
transaction cost economics in which he argues that bounded rationality, asset specificity and scope
for opportunism lead to transaction cost arising (Williamson, 1985):
Bounded rationality means that human do not have enough abilities or resources to consider
every state-contingent outcome associated with a transaction that might arise.  It is difficult to
decide in terms of insufficient knowledge or uncertainty or complexity. Bounded rationality limits
8people’s ability to receive, store and process information without error leading to large cost when it
reaches threshold. For example, looking at a chess match, players have to record rules of game as
well as the reaction of competitors. In each step, the player considers different strategies of
competitor, and this process continues until the end of the match. In the case of multiple steps like
that, the player will fall into bounded rationality. This person must decide in the absence of perfect
information so that he or she spends great cost for avoiding failure. Similarly, a PPP project is
complex and implemented in long-term. At the first period of project, public sector and sponsors
build a PPP contract which involves duties and benefits of all participants. However, it is very
difficult to estimate what happen during life-cycle of project and build a suitable contract.
According to this, transaction cost appears in form of cost for searching information, negotiation,
signing and implementing contracts, monitoring results and etc.
Asset specificity forms when transaction is supported by specific investment or contribution
to development of special knowledge or training. The value of an asset may be attached to a
particular transaction that it supports.  The asset requires people who use them to have suitable
compromise for the use of resources. Sometimes users can be forced into (log in) asset specificity,
and sometimes the property makes difficulty for users (hold up). All of this
behaviour causes transaction costs.
Opportunism means that humans will act to further their own self-interests. Opportunity
act exists when people are unreliable. They tend to falsely express intention in the form
of false promise or insufficient relations of future contracts. False information and limited
disclosure are opportunity acts. Note that not all people have opportunity tendency. However, the
problem will become more serious if opportunity acts are behaviours of many people. Because it
leads to great transaction cost.
In PPP model, government cooperates with private sector in supplying public services on the
basis of project contract. According to Williamson, the world of contract is world of governance (or
private ordering) in which contract depends on three features such as bounded rationality,
opportunism and asset specificity. This is the world that transaction cost economics is concerned. If
all three factors appear simultaneously, they will cause transaction costs. The organizational
imperative is: “Organize transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality while
simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism”(Williamson, 1985).
1.3 Expected outcome
Since 1996, Vietnam has applied PPP model in infrastructural investment. Beside
the achievements, there are restrictions such as some projects do not complete on time and
effectiveness of some projects is low. Therefore, Vietnam needs innovations in PPP application.
9This research is expected to help government secure VFM in using PPP model and find out
reformed ideals of PPP model that suit Vietnam condition.
2. Literature review
Part I: PPP models
2.1.1 Definition of PPP model
Actually, a large number of PPP concepts are defined in different countries and under
different circumstances by a variety of academics, public agencies and international organizations.
These differences begin from the specific fundamentals of each country and the individual interests
of each academic. Therefore, up to now, there is not a universal definition for PPP. In scope of the
thesis, a PPP definition by Andreas Bergmann in the year of 2009 is as mentioned: “Partnership
between public and private sector entities to deliver a public sector asset (normally infrastructure or
a public facility) and/or service. The partnership includes multiple exchange relationships, typically
over a longer, defined period of time. The risks involved are usually allocated between the public
and private sector partners”(Bergmann, 2009, p. 138). Obviously, the PPP definition shows that
public sector allows private sector to participate its own activities such as providing public facilities
or public services. This is an innovative step in which public sector changes its traditional ways of
working. On one hand, public sector agencies are transformed from positions of owners and
operators of public infrastructures and/or services into positions of departments that buy services
from private sector. On the other hand, private sector invests financial resources to provide public
infrastructures or/and public services. Actually, PPP is long-term partnership within which the risk
is shared between public and private sectors. Therefore, a successful PPP requires a considerably
close combination of different conditions of both public and private sector. From the viewpoint of
public sector, a PPP project has abilities to achieve a greater benefit, compare with traditional
projects that public sector implements by own forces, sources and finance. It means that public
sector pays attention to vale for money when it uses PPP model (TETŘEVOVÁ, 2006, pp. 105-
106).
2.1.2 The characteristics of PPP model
The characteristics of PPP model are considerably different from those of traditional
procurement. Therefore, governments can use PPP approach as a new method to build public
facilities and supply public services. Actually, a variety of researchers and international
organizations mention on characteristics of PPP scheme by different ways. However, in general,
PPP model has four main features as follows:
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Firstly, in each PPP project, there is a co-operation between public sector and private sector
to supply public infrastructure and the related services. Obviously, through PPP model, many
governments have approved and stressed the important roles of private sector in traditional fields of
public sector, especially financial investments of private partners (Fund, 2004, p. 6). Actually, there
are a variety of changes in PPP scheme compares with traditional procurement. For example, duties
of private partners are designing, building, financing and managing public facilities lead to reaching
more effective results (Fund, 2004, p. 7).
Secondly, in fact, every PPP project is usually concretized by a long-term contract between
public agency and private partner (Stephen Ogunlana, 2009, p. 10). It is the only contract in which a
government franchises management and control of public assets for private sector. However, these
assets do not belong to private sector forever. When a PPP contract finishes, the assets return to
government ownership (Eduardo Engel, 2007, p. 1). This characteristic proves that PPP model is
not a privatization of government facilities.
Thirdly, PPP scheme includes innovative step in which output specification, service levels
and payment mechanisms are determined in the contract before PPP project begins(Stephen
Ogunlana, 2009, p. 10). It means that PPP model focuses on quality of public facilities and the
related services. According to this, output results of the project are more attention for reaching more
effectiveness.
Finally, effectiveness of PPP model begins from sharing risks and responsibilities between
public and private sector suitably (Stephen Ogunlana, 2009, p. 10). Actually, government transfers a
considerable part of risk for private partners, especially financial risks. It means that duty of private
sector is supplying capital for PPP projects. As a result, it contributes decrease in public debt. In
addition, PPP model requires private sector to guarantee
2.1.3 The benefits and limitations of PPP model
In fact, there are many findings and discussions about benefits and limitations of PPP model.
Generally, besides a wide variety of benefits that PPP model can provide for government and
private partners, it also has certain limitations as showed in table 2.1 below:
Table 2.1 Benefits and limitations of PPP model
Benefits of PPP model Limitations of PPP model
• PPP model makes projects affordable. Under
PPP, private sector is attracted to finance for
schemes suited to the PPP model. This cost is
repaid by a service charge from the authority
• PPP model requires sufficient expertise of
private sector to warrant the PPP approach. For
example, private partners have to be able to
supply more effective service, experienced in
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over time or by revenues from the project, or a
combination of the two. It means that private
sector receives its invested capital, only if
services are being successfully delivered. This
process is implemented in long-term period so
that the cost of project is repaid gradually over
each year. As a result, PPP projects are
affordable.
• PPP maximizes the use of private sector skills.
Public sector authorities may be lack the
necessary skills and training to implement
projects, and therefore they often do not have
enough capabilities to deliver projects and
maintain them over a variety of years. Actually,
through PPP model, public sector can utilize not
only capital but also experiences, technologies
and management skills of private sector to reach
a best value of projects.
• Under PPP, the private sector takes life cycle
cost risk. PPP model requires the private sector
to compete for building facilities and delivering
related services with the most economically
advantageous price in long term. It means that
the private sector has to analyze and provide for
life cycle costs, and design accordingly.
• With PPP, risks are allocated to the party best
able to manage or absorb each particular risk.
Usually, a considerable part of risks is
transferred from public to private sector because
private sector has the necessary long-term
project skills and the public sector does not.
According to this, PPP model can increase
effects of risks on results of projects.
pricing life cycle costs and experienced enough
to manage and absorb the particular risks of the
PPP projects. In addition, PPP model still
requires a sufficient number of private sector
bidders that have enough potential for an
effective competition.
• Under PPP, public sector must have sufficient
capacity and skills to adopt the PPP approach. It
means that the public procuring agencies must
have, or be able to develop, the requisite
capability to assess and deliver value for money
at the outset when government chooses services
that should be procured and formulates project
specifications. During the bidding process,
governments ensure that bids prove to be better
value than public procurement alternatives.
Moreover, the government also needs to
understand whether PPP approach should be
used or not.
•  It  is  not  always  possible  to  transfer  life  cycle
cost risk. One of main objectives of PPP model
is that public sector transfers the life cycle cost
risk to private sector effectively. However, in
some particular cases, that objective does not
meet. For example, it is very is difficult for
private partners to finish its own duties when
facilities cannot be separated from a wider asset
base that is maintained by a third party.
• PPP model does not achieve absolute risk
transfer. Actually, PPP projects are often
constructed by using Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) companies. SPV companies are structured
to absorb a reasonable level of disadvantageous
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• PPP delivers budgetary certainty. At the first
step of PPP projects, the future costs of projects
are calculated and the public sector will know
about outputs of known costs.
• Through PPP model, the public sector focuses
on outputs and benefits from the start. It means
that detailed service levels are defined at the
outset to minimize or remove the need for
“change orders”. In addition, PPP model
requires suitable choices between the ideal
service levels an authority might want and what
is actually affordable. Therefore, PPP projects
can avoid being far more expensive than
originally envisaged.
• With PPP, the quality of public facilities and
related services has to be maintained during life
cycles of projects. The quality is specified at the
outset and is not expected to decline throughout
the life of the PPP. In addition, at the beginning
of PPP projects, committed price guarantees
private partners to maintain those quality
standards in whole cycle life of projects.
• PPP encourages the development of specialist
skills. Strict requirements of PPP model have led
to significant opportunities for the private sector
that is encouraged skilled in operating and
maintaining new facilities. For example, a large
number of companies have invested in the
expertise and understanding of the PPP market
and pricing of deals on a whole life cost basis.
• PPP transactions can be off balance sheet. This
means that the assets of PPP projects and the
related liabilities do not appear on the
changes, consistent with raising bank finance.
However, SPV companies typically have high
levels of debt and relatively low levels of equity.
Therefore, they are unable to absorb unlimited
risk. For this reason, it cannot be guaranteed that
an SPV will not run into financial difficulties. In
this case, the private sector might fail to deliver
services fully and the public sector will have to
continue the failing project. It means that
incomplete or underperforming infrastructures
could return to the government.
• The private sector has a higher cost of finance.
For instant, the finance costs of private sector
contain a premium for the risks of long-term
contracts. If the public sector uses traditional
procedure, it does not incur this cost.
• PPP projects are long-term relatively inflexible
structures. In long-term period, there are
considerable changes that influence on the PPP
projects. For example, the requirements of
services need to change while expenditure for
these changes is relatively limited. Therefore,
inflexible structures of PPP projects are
challenges when the projects are implemented in
that fact.
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authority’s balance sheet nor increase public
debt. The majority of risks will be transferred to
private sector.
Source: Adapted from Kathryn Eustice and et al, 2005, p.17-33
2.1.4 Types of PPP model
Actually, there are a variety of classifying ways in PPP model. One of the most popular
ways is that forms of PPP can be determined based on the scope of tasks, risks, and responsibilities
that public sector transfers to the private partner. Under this way, there are three main PPP and
many different PPP types as the variations of these three main types, as follows (Joop F.
M.Koppenjan, 2009, p. 285):
- Operation, maintenance and service contracts: private sector implements public services
with agreed costs and these services have to meet performance standards that governments issue. In
this case, public sector funds and invests capital for projects. It means that this type of PPP model
can not solve the problem of limited public budgets and is expected to reach more effectiveness.
- Build, operate and invest: private partners have to invest finance to construct a new
infrastructure or upgrade existing infrastructure. After life cycle of project, private parties have to
recover their investment costs and project return to the government. Concession contracts and the
build - operate - transfer (BOT) model are two typical examples of this type.
- Joint ventures: public and private sector invest in joint ventures. In this case, benefits and
risks are shared for both.
In other way, types of PPP model are classified in term of ownership, funding and control.
Ownership could be government, private sector or joint.  Capital for PPP project is from  either
partners,  while  control  mention  to  the  partner  that  have to operate and maintain PPP projects.
A variety of different combinations in term of ownership, funding and control determines the type
of PPP. Actually, degree of governmental control and private economic scale decide whether
private sector only can provide related services or have outright ownership of facilities. Some
examples of this classifying way are following (Darrin Grimsey, 2004, pp. 10-11):
- BOT (Build Operate Transfer). BOT is an agreement where the private sector takes
primary responsibility for financing, designing, building and operating the project in a long –term
period. After private sector has earned its capital and profit, control and formal ownership of the
project is returned to the public sector. For example, in United Kingdom, one of classical BOT
projects is the third Dartford Crossing of the River Thames linking two stretches of the M25
motorway circling London. The vehicle company operates this project with virtually guaranteed toll
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income for up to 20 years, after that the infrastructure is transferred to the United Kingdom
government.
- BOO (Build Own Operate). Under BOO contracts, private sector remains the control and
the ownership of the projects remain in its hands. It means that the private partner finances, builds,
owns and operates a public facility effectively in perpetuity. An example comes from the water
treatment plants serving parts of South Australia. These facilities, financed, designed, built and
operated by a private sector firm, process raw water, provided by the public sector entity, into
filtered water which is then returned to the public sector utility for delivery to consumers.
- Leasing. Public sector transfers a part of risks to the private sector. Usually, government
has responsibility in designing and building infrastructure. And then government leases it out or
contracts it to the private sector that has to operate and maintain the infrastructure.
- Joint ventures (JV). Under JV contract, public and private sector jointly finance, own and
operate a facility for a specific duration.
- Operations or management contracts. In these agreements, private sector only participates
in projects partially. It means that private sector can provide a related service or manage the
operations of facility for specified periods of time.
- Cooperative arrangements are informal partnerships between the public sector and the
private sector in which public sector provides fiscal incentives and attracts the private sector to
invest in physical or infrastructural development in their respective areas.
A type of PPP model is affected by a variety of factors such as skills of public and private
partners, capabilities, limitations, nature of project, environment and etc. Moreover, types of PPP
model suit different level of requirements of government. Therefore, when government wants to
implement a PPP project, it decide to choose suitable type of PPP model that can delivery best
addresses on its specific objectives and allows an optimum transfer of  responsibilities and  risks  to
the private  sector  to meet  the objectives of  value-for-money. In scope of this thesis, there are
three types of PPP model are mentioned such as Build – Operate – Transfer (BOT), Build –
Transfer – Operate (BTO) and Build – Transfer (BT).
2.1.5 Stakeholders of PPP projects
Actually, academics defined a variety of stakeholder concepts in which about 20 of 75
definitions share traditional ideal about stakeholder of Freeman. He mentioned stakeholder as "any
individual or group who can affect or is affected by actions, decisions, policies, practices, or goals
of the organization" ((Charles Fontaine, 2006, p.6) cited(Freeman, 1984)). Typically, in a PPP
project, stakeholders are seen as participants who are directly involved in the project through
contractual agreements. Usually, the stakeholders of PPP projects are government agency, private
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partners as sponsors and lenders. In addition, the final purpose of PPP projects is meeting
requirements of end users. According to this, PPP projects consider end users as stakeholders.
2.1.5.1 Government agency
What are roles of government agencies? In the fact that a government agency is a
government department or statutory authority that is an integral party of a PPP project.  Generally,
in a PPP project, the roles of government agency are considerably crucial, including granting to the
sponsors a concession, granting a long-term lease of the site or selling the site to sponsors, and often
acquiring most or all the related services from the PPP project. Before a PPP project initiated,
government agency has to consider two main aspects of the project. The first aspect is the priority
of the project. Actually, every country has a competitive variety of public projects that are
necessary to reach national growth. Therefore, government agency examines the necessities of the
project to decide whether it should implement the project. The second aspect is considering all
conditions to apply PPP model in the project. Because applications of PPP model requires a lot of
strict conditions that help public sector transfer risks to private sector and achieve greater
efficiency. It means that government agency considers whether requirements of PPP model are met
or the project should be implemented by traditional procedure. In the next stage, a government
agency will start the project, implement the tendering process and evaluate abilities of bidders.
During cycle life of PPP project, government agency ensures that private partners must meet all
required standards and safeguard the public interests. According to The World Bank, the
government agency is expected to ensure the successful PPP by clarifying the policy and legal
framework that can help investors in reducing uncertainties; using legal  terms  and  approaches
that  should  be  familiar  to  the international  private  sector to  simplify  the  procedures  in  PPP
arrangements  and  reduce transaction costs; using supports of PPP unit of government that is
relevant to commercial and legal skills to ensure consistency and credibility about the public
sector’s competence; and seriousness of intent and capitalizing on the experience of
others(Development, 2009, p. 18). Besides that, government should assist private sector in reaching
the necessary approvals, authorizations and consents for the construction and operation of PPP
project.  To compare between traditional public procurement methods and PPP model, single role of
government as a project manager is changed to a multiple role as a project manager, inspector,
customer, and partner. As a result, risks of PPP project such as increased investment of customers,
unrealistic contract durations and interventions during the construction phase of customers may be
mitigated.
2.1.5.2 Sponsors
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In PPP model, besides government agency, another important partner is sponsors that are a
party or a consortium of interested groups. In the fact is that sponsors possess large capital,
advanced technologies and management skills which can meet the invitation of the government
agency. They usually prepare the general proposal within constructing, operating, financing and
maintaining of a particular PPP project. On the other hand, they expect to gain a high return from
the construction and operation of the projects to compensate for their investments.
In order to participate in the PPP project, private companies as sponsors often establish a
legal unit called the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that usually include a construction company, a
facilities management company and an additional equity provider. Generally, the SPV is supplied
capital from debt of bank and equity of members approximately 90 % and 10 % respectively
((Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, pp.16-17) cited from (Spackman, 2002)). The SPV has its own right that
is distinct from the root organizations of SPV members. Usually, the SPV is set up for only one
project so that it has limited lifespan corresponding to the length of PPP project (Stephen J. Bailey,
2010, pp.16-17). Under concession agreement, the  SPV implements and  manages  the  project  and
has  ultimate  liabilities  to  the government about effectiveness of the project.
2.1.5.3 Lender
Under PPP projects, a main part of capital is often funded by commercial debts that are
provided by banks ((Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, pp.16-17) cited from (Spackman, 2002)) play role as
lenders. Additionally, PPP projects have long-term life spans and compensation mechanism for
investments through user frees and/or government transfers (Eduardo Engel, 2007, p. 1). Sponsors
only receive their invested capital when services of PPP projects are being successfully delivered. It
means that loans of PPP sponsors often have long loan periods and uncertain revenue streams.
Therefore, in PPP projects, lenders usually provide limited or non-recourse debts that are secured by
a pledge of collateral, typically real property. They evaluate to identify and test sensitivities to
ascertain whether the project suits non-recourse finance. Moreover, lenders always want to protect
their loans and investments so that they are very interested in the demand and revenue forecasts of
the project, and often examine progress of project implementation and administration of contract to
ensure cost, schedule, and completion guarantees.
2.1.5.4 Construction contractor
Actually, PPP model requires construction contractors must complete the project on time
within approved budget and meet required specifications. In addition, requirements of sponsors are
usually fixing price and time construction contract. Obviously, these requirements include
considerable risks. Therefore, main financiers as lenders will only feel safe when they see a
powerful construction company that has sufficient abilities to finish its duties effectively.
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2.1.5.5 End users
Obviously, end users use related services of PPP projects directly. It means that results of
PPP projects must meet requirements and make satisfaction of end users. In traditional way,
governments often provide public infrastructure services free for users or on a direct charge basis
with government subsidies. However, in fact, governments finance for traditional procedure by
public budget, perhaps users have to pay unsuitable costs for public services through taxes. In
contract with PPP model, users pay fee for provided services directly (Kathryn Eustice and et al,
2005, p.17-33). Therefore, building payment mechanisms of PPP projects should base on
willingness of users to pay for using services. Because of this, forecasts about future revenues of
PPP projects are more exactly. In addition, better meeting demands of users is useful condition to
improve PPP contribution for socioeconomic development.
2.1.6 Contractual structure
Under PPP projects, contractual structure is a complex system within a variety of parties and
their relationships are defined by contracts. These contracts have an important role in PPP projects
because they determine rights, obligations of participants and risk transfers in the project.
Figure 2.1 Contractual structure of a typical PPP project
Source: Adapted from Stephen Ogunlana, 2009, p. 22
2.1.6.1 Concession agreement
Concession agreement is the background that all activities of a PPP project have to base on.
Under PPP model, it is an important agreement within a public authority permits a private party to
design, build, finance, and operate public infrastructure in a fixed and long-tem period, usually 25-
30 years (Development, 2009, p. 9). Concession agreement shows relationships, rights and
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obligations of government agency and private partner as a SPV. Actually, content of concession
agreement usually relates with “to  financing,  design  and  construction,  operation  and
maintenance,  land  issues,  termination,  guarantee  agreements,  monitoring  and  variation
procedure, and dispute resolution” (Stephen Ogunlana, 2009, p. 23). Moreover, it is a legal tool that
helps government regulate all related activities and decisions of private partner and it is used to
allocate risks between parties.
2.1.6.2 Other contracts/agreements
In following types of contract, private partner as a SPV bases on content of concession
agreement to sign other contracts for implementing stages of PPP projects.
Loan and stakeholder agreements:
The main target of these agreements is creating capital for activities of PPP projects.
Normally, the finance is contributed from debt and equity stake so that it is provided through bank
loans and bonds and/or equity from members of consortium.
Construction contract:
In the scope of this contract, beside SPV, contractors have important role in the design,
procurement, construction, completion and testing of an infrastructure. Usually, construction
contract of a PPP project is a fixed-date, lump sum and turnkey contract in which contractors offer a
lump sum price without effects of inflation. Therefore, contractors in this contract have to accept
more risks than those in traditional contract.
Supply agreement:
Under this agreement, SPV signs either directly with suppliers or indirectly through a
contractor to supply important equipment or materials for construction or operation of public
infrastructure. This type of contract has competitive prices and guarantees enough important
equipment or materials for the facility to run smoothly and generate the necessary revenues.
Operation and maintenance agreements:
The final purpose of operation and maintenance agreements are management, operation,
maintenance and repair facilities of PPP project. SPV of the project can undertake management,
operation and maintenance the infrastructure itself, or it can choose to sign contract with specialized
operators.
2.1.7 Risks of PPP model
Actually, there are a variety of risks not only in PPP projects but also in private and public
projects. According to International Monetary Fund, these risks can be usefully divided into five
main types, namely construction risk, financial risk, performance risk, demand risk and residual
value risk, as follows (Fund, 2004, pp. 11-12):
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- Firstly, construction risk is related to design problems, building cost overruns, and project
delays.
- Secondly, financial risk is related to variability in interest rates, exchange rates, and other
factors affecting financing costs.
- Thirdly, performance risk is related to the availability of an asset, and the continuity and
quality of service provision.
- Fourthly, demand risk is related to the ongoing need for services.
- Finally, residual value risk is related to the future market price of an asset.
According to Bing Li and et al, risks of PPP projects are classified into three levels such as
‘macro’ risks, ‘meso’ risks and ‘micro’ risks. Firstly, the macro level includes external risks of PPP
projects that are often associated with political and legal conditions, economic conditions, social
conditions, weather and residual risk. In fact that, these risks are caused by events that occur outside
the system boundaries of a project, while their consequences cross the project boundary to impact
upon the project and its outcomes. Secondly, the meso level of PPP risk includes risks sourced
endogenously such as project demand/usage, location, design and construction, and technology. It is
obvious that these risk and their consequences occur inside the system boundaries of the project.
Thirdly, the micro level mentions risks found in the stakeholder relationships formed in the
procurement process. Actually, the public and private sectors have inherent differences because the
public sector has social responsibility while the private sector is interested in its profit. These risks
are a type of endogenous risks but they are party-related rather than project-related. That is a
different point from meso risks (Li Bing, 2004, p. 19).
Table 2.2 Three levels of risks in PPP model
Levels of risks Groups of risks Risks factors
Macro level Political and government policy - Unstable government
- Expropriation or nationalization of assets
- Poor public decision-making process
- Strong political opposition/hostility
Macroeconomic - Poor financial market
- Inflation rate volatility
- Interest rate volatility
- Influential economic events
Legal - Legislation change
- Change in tax regulation
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- Industrial regulatory change
Social - Lack of tradition of private provision of
public services
- Level of public opposition to project
Natural - Force majeure
- Geotechnical conditions
- Weather
- Environment
Residual risk - Residual risks
Meso level Project selection - Land acquisition (site availability)
- Level of demand for project
Project finance - Availability of finance
- Financial attraction of project to investors
- High finance costs
Design - Delay in project approvals and permits
- Design deficiency
- Unproven engineering techniques
Construction - Construction cost overrun
- Construction time delay
- Material/labour availability
- Late design changes
- Poor quality workmanship
- Excessive contract variation
- Insolvency/default of sub-contractors or
suppliers
Operation - Operation cost overrun
- Operational revenues below expectation
- Low operating productivity
- Maintenance costs higher than expected
- Maintenance more frequent than expected
Micro level Relationship - Organisation and co-ordination risk
- Inadequate experience in PPP
- Inadequate distribution of responsibilities
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and risks
- Inadequate distribution of authority in
partnership
- Differences in working method and know-
how between partners
- Lack of commitment from either partner
Third party - Third Party Tort Liability
- Staff Crises
Source: adapted from Li Bing, 2004, p. 28
Obviously, risks have negative effects on performance of PPP projects considerably. For
example, there are some risk factors that lead to failure of PPP project such as poor transparency,
difference in interests and expectations, inappropriate feasibility study, lack of government
commitment and objectives, complex decision-making, poorly defined sector policies, inadequate
legal and regulatory framework, poor risk sharing and management, low credibility of government
policies, inadequate domestic capital markets, lack of mechanism to attract long-term finance from
private, sources at affordable rates and lack of competition (Patrick X.W. Zou, 2008, p. 126).
Moreover, a variety of specific risks cover all phases of lifecycle of PPP projects. In pre-
investment phase, major risks are bidding risks, delayed planning risks and approval risks. For
example, bidders have to spend a lot of money on preparing comprehensive bid documents. This
cost will increase depend on scale of PPP projects. It means that this cost is very great in large PPP
projects. In case of tender fails in competition with other bidders, it will lose costs of preparation
PPP projects. This is a type of bidding risks. In implementation phase, major risks are cost overrun,
time delay and the even failure to achieve completion. In operation phase, the biggest risk is that
projected revenues are not enough to meet the budgeted operating and maintenance expenses.
Normally, there are little risks including in transfer phase.
It is clear that risks appear in all phases of PPP projects so an accurate risk analysis and
assessment throughout the whole lifecycle of PPP projects is very necessary to ensure success of
these PPP projects. Optimal risk allocation and balance of interests between the public and private
sectors play important roles in achieving value for money in PPP projects (Patrick X.W. Zou, 2008,
p. 137).
2.1.8 Institutional policy and legal framework of PPP projects
2.1.8.1 Policy framework
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It is obvious that a clear policy framework helps both the public and the private sectors to
know about the core rationale for PPP projects and the way that government ensure for making
them happen (Development, 2009, p. 13). This is very important because a stable policy
environment is a convenient condition for real implementing of PPP projects. According to United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, in  order  to win  the  support for application of PPP
model, PPP process should have a coherent policies  that includes clear objectives  and  principles,
realistic goals and measure  of  achieving  them are  set  up appropriately (Europe, 2008, p. 18). In
addition, characteristic of public services is not commercial products so that the services are often
heavily dependent on taxes. Moreover, targets of public services are not simply economic
effectiveness; they also include a variety of purposes such as social equity, inclusiveness,
accessibility, transparency and accountability. Therefore, while PPP model uses commercial criteria
to supply public services, it cannot substitute  the  public  interest  goals  enshrined  in  public
services appropriately (Europe, 2008, p. 18). As a result, establishing stable policy framework is
very necessary to balance between economic and social objectives of PPP projects. It means that
this framework can help a PPP project reach the best value for money.
Under PPP model, private partners are usually main financiers and must bear almost risks so
that they always want to protect their capital. Therefore, private sector is often very careful before
they decide to invest in PPP projects. What does private sector look at first? It is easy to understand
that it is policy framework. Private sector always expects to see aspects of a PPP policy as follows
(Development, 2009, p. 14):
- The rationale for using PPP model,
- The guidelines that the public sector will use to assess PPP projects in a consistent way,
- The determination of who approves what and when throughout the process of project
selection, preparation, and procurement, and
- The process of resolving disputes (often set out in legislation).
On one hand, private sector always wants to know about PPP policy as detailed as possible.
Policy framework helps private partners understand about processes of PPP projects, assess to
estimate costs for preparing and submitting bids, know about time of bidding process, level of
feasibility and transparency of the project, the method that public authority will use to manage long-
term partnership. Especially, policy framework shows commitments of governments that ensure
implementing of PPP projects. On the other hand, governments should issue a comprehensive
system of PPP policy by establishing a clear evaluation and process map that includes key decision
points along the process, timelines, criteria for project selection and eligibility, and principles or
criteria for evaluating tenders (Development, 2009, p. 14).
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2.1.8.2 Legal framework
Actually, private investors always examine legal framework within abilities to guarantee
effectiveness of long-term PPP contracts. According to United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, in PPP projects, private partners need predictability and security in fewer, simpler and
better rules. Additionally,  the  legal  framework  needs  to  mention beneficiaries that are
authorized to participate  in  legal process, protects  their  rights and guarantees them access in
decision-making (Europe, 2008, p. 29).
In order to motivate PPP projects to develop successful, legal frameworks and related
regulations should be clear, secure, predictable, stable, consistent and commercial. These
characteristics are basis for creating a favourable environment and encourage private sector to
participate in PPP projects. How do governments issue good legal frameworks and related
regulations like those? Actually, governments could base on following key principles and priorities
as follows (Europe, 2008, p. 29):
- Rights of private investors in disposing their property and assets should be protected.
- Quality of legislation can be improved through innovations such as fewer, better and
simpler rules.
- Enforcement more business sensitive should be made.
- Effectiveness of the judiciary in the enforcement of contracts should be improved.
- Legal frameworks of PPP projects should be developed on the basis that includes
consultations in many areas. These areas often have most directly effects on the start up of the
project and its operation, such as concession, tax, competition, company laws and etc.
If legal framework of PPP model becomes fewer and more flexible, it allows focusing on
achieving outcomes dramatically and encourages all partners to design and implement projects
efficiently. In fact, if this framework is over-complicated and rigid, it will hinder willingness of
private investors to invest in infrastructure development. Therefore, governments should execute
the following tasks to make fewer and flexible legal framework (Europe, 2008, p.p. 29 - 30):
- Removing burdensome legal constrains on investors using public assets.
- Removing, streamlining unnecessary approval procedures for construction and land use.
- Removing legal restrictions on right of investors lead to investors can use the benefits of
their investment. For example, investors can dispose their equity investment at market prices and
repatriate the profits out of the country.
Moreover, if procedures of legal framework become simpler, it is an advantage condition for
improving competition in PPP model. As a result, governments may have a variety of chances to
choose good partners for increasing effectiveness of PPP projects. There are some methods to
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simplify the procedures of PPP projects. Firstly, governments can standardize then stakeholders can
accordingly share the understanding of the main risks, determine price across a range of similar
projects and reduce the time and costs of negotiation. Secondly, legal framework may allow
aggregation of projects. It means that this method includes contracting with only one  partner  to
provide  several  small-scale  projects  and  incremental  partnership  that allow a partnership  to be
developed gradually by  stages  rather  than  in one  time.  In this case, economies of scale and
lower costs are used to increase incentives for investors. Lastly, governments can use the
“Competitive Dialogue” to avoid subjective decisions of contracting authorities. This agreement
includes working with bidders to develop technical and commercial solutions. According to this, it
has solutions to overcome the inherent complexity of PPP projects, whereas the contracting
authority must to guarantee the fairness in the tendering procedures and avoid favouritism (Europe,
2008, p. 31).
Part II: Value for money for three main targeted PPP models
2.2.1 What is “value for money” of project?
Value for money (VFM) is paramount and it is core principle that is basis for types of
procedure activity, involving PPP model (Administration, 2006, p. 7). Actually, VFM is one of
essential elements that government should consider before making decision on public projects.
What is VFM? According to Grimsey and Lewis, VFM means that “the effective use of public
funds on a capital project, can come from the private sector innovation and skills in asset design,
construction techniques and operational practices, and also from transferring key risks in design,
construction delays, cost overruns and finance and insurance to private sector entities” (M.K.Lewis,
2002, p. 109). Another concept mentions VFM as “the optimum combination of the whole life and
sufficient quality to meet the user’s requirements and investment objectives” (Stephen J. Bailey,
2010, p. 46). Does a PPP project reach VFM when it has the lowest cost bid? According to HM
Treasury, actually, VFM does not depend on the lowest cost bid (Treasury, 2006, p. 7). In general
speaking, the key characteristics of VFM are suitable cost bid, effective transferring and meeting
requirements of end users.
2.2.2 Factors affect on achieving value for money
In fact, there are a variety of factors that drive VFM of PPP projects. For example, HM
Treasury gives 10 main factors as follows (Treasury, 2006, p. 8):
- The optimum allocation of risks: risks should be allocated to parties, which are best placed
to manage. Moreover, these risks should be minimized over the lifecycle of PPP projects;
- Focusing on the whole life costs of the asset rather than only the upfront costs involved;
- Integrated planning and design of the facilities-related;
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- The use of an outputs specification approach describes requirements of public projects. As
a result, it allows potential bidders to improve innovations to meet requirements of public
authorities;
- A rigorously executed transfer of risks which mentions to responsibilities of each party.
According to this, it must ensure that the allocation of risks can be implemented seriously and
related costs are actually borne by the parties as in originally allocated agreement;
- Sufficient flexibility that helps PPP projects to adapt any changes during their lifecycle;
- Ensuring sufficient incentives lead to assets and services are developed and delivered on
time and effectively, including both rewards and deductions as may be appropriate;
- The term of the contract requires careful considerations of elements such as potential
changes in requirements of end users; policy changes; facility upgrades during the period of the
contract; potential changes in the way of supplying services; and the way to transfer the facility at
the end of the contract;
- Sufficient skills and expertise in both the public and private sectors are required during
lifecycle of projects; and
- Managing the scale and complexity of project to ensure that expenditures are proportionate
to project.
According to results of recent survey of the UK Treasury Taskforce on PPP, there are six
main determinants of VFM including risk transfer; the long-term nature of contracts (including
whole-of-life cycle costing); the use of an output specification; competition; performance
measurement and incentives; and private sector management skills. In addition, European
Commission mentions to five elements that affect on VFM of PPP projects such as reduced life
cycle costs, better allocation of risk, faster implementation, improved service quality and generation
of additional revenue (Commission, 2003, p. 55). Moreover, an ideal of Asenova et al., Barretta and
Ruggieero and Kharizam Ismail et al. shows that social benefits as the outcomes are one of the vital
factors in measuring VFM in PPP projects ((Kharizam Ismail., 2011, p. 352) cited from (D.
Asenova, 2005) and (A. Barretta, 2008)). Obviously, factors that determine VFM will be different
from project to project and between sectors. Of these, reduced life cycle costs, efficient allocation of
risk and social benefits are seen to be the most important elements that drive VFM of PPP projects.
Reduced lifecycle costs
Under PPP projects, there are two main methods that may reduce life cycle costs, including
competition and minimizing transaction cost. On one hand, competition is one of vital factors that
affects on achieving VFM in PPP projects. It creates an environment in which bidders are
encouraged to innovate in their design solution and efficient in service delivery for reaching optimal
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solution with most suitable cost (Darrin Grimsey, 2004, pp. 135-136). In a fairly competitive
environment, it is clear that bidder that has optimal solution with most suitable cost will have
biggest opportunity to become a winner. However, it is important to notice that “most suitable cost”
does not mean lowest cost. “Most suitable cost” focuses on quality of public facility and related
services, and meeting requirements of end users considerably. On the other hand, minimizing
transaction cost contributes to reducing lifecycle costs of PPP projects dramatically. In PPP model,
agreement between public and private sector is single contract known as the whole-of-life cycle
‘bundled’ approach. It means that there is integration between design, construction and operation of
the facility lead to considerable drop in transaction costs. As a result, built facilities from PPP
projects are suitable for the provision of core services and meet requirements of the facilities
operator. This ‘bundled’ method allows maximizing service efficiencies as well as aiding
maintainability and minimizing life cycle costs from small changes such as using better quality
materials. In fact, small changes affect on whole project cumulatively (Darrin Grimsey, 2004, p.
136). Peter Drucker supports for this ideal that innovation is often about the cumulative effect of a
variety of small changes ((Darrin Grimsey, 2004, p. 136) cited from (Drucker, 1984)). It is one of
different points between PPP model and traditional procurement methods.
Efficient allocation of risk
Under PPP model, identification, allocation and management of risks play important role in
determining VFM of projects. VFM is achieved by the transfer of appropriate risk to reach efficient
allocation of risk. It is important to highlight that risk transfer is the objective of the PPP
arrangement and focuses on optimum, rather than maximum (Darrin Grimsey, 2004, p. 136). It
means that public sector can not transfer all risks of PPP projects to private partners. Moreover,
government should retain suitable risks or share them with private sectors. According to result of
research about VFM and risk allocation model, risk should be allocated “to whom is best able to
manage, control, or bear it” (Bing Li, p. 19). In addition, United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe mentions a similar ideal in risk allocation of PPP model as “PPP model allows risk which is
most able to be managed by the private sector, to be transferred to them. However,  governments
also  need  to  accept  their  share  and  help  to mitigate those allocated to the private sector in
mutual support” (Europe, 2008, p. 36). This is a general principle of risk management in PPP
projects that guarantees effective allocation of risks in PPP projects. As a result of doing this
principle, PPP model will have lower overall project costs and will therefore reach more VFM than
traditional procurement methods (Commission, 2003, p. 50). Moreover, time can be saved and costs
overrun can be restricted through effective risk allocation. Obviously, the concern in this case is
how can risks be allocated effectively?
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Social benefits
Social benefits are part of non-financial benefits that mention to contribution of PPP model
in socioeconomic development. As an argument of The European PPP Expertise Centre((EPEC)),
non-financial benefits means “socio-economic” benefits of end users or wider society from an
infrastructure investment ((EPEC), 2011, p. 4). These benefits can be classified into two categories,
including wider public sector benefits and wider macro-economic benefits. On one hand, wider
public sector benefits refer to the impact of a specific PPP project to the public sector. Actually,
when private sector implements PPP projects, it has a variety of innovations that can be learned and
applied in future projects. Therefore, beneficiaries from PPP projects are not only end users but also
the broader public sector and economy. On the other hand, wider macro-economic benefits refer to
the impact of an investment on the economy and environment ((EPEC)), 2011, p. 16).
2.2.3 The principles to achieves VFM in PPP model.
Obviously, reduced lifecycle cost, effective allocation risk and social benefit play important
role in achieving VFM. How are three factors managed in PPP projects for reaching VFM? In fact,
there are a variety of researches of sciences and international organizations that focus on this
concern. Especially, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe studies and shows seven
main principles of good governance in PPP projects (Europe, 2008, pp. 18-64). Some of them are
related to these factors considerably.
2.2.3.1 Principle to reduce lifecycle cost of PPP projects
As shown in 2.2.2, competition and reducing transaction costs are two ways to minimize
lifecycle cost. On one hand, government should ensure competitive environment to choose the most
suitable bidder by implementing principle as follows: “The  selection  of  the  bidder  should  be
undertaken  following  a  transparent, neutral and non-discriminatory selection process  that
promotes competition and strikes a balance  between  the  need  to  reduce  the  length  of  time  and
cost  of  the  bid  process  and, acquiring the best proposal. Along these lines, corruption should be
penalized as well” (Europe, 2008, p.46). Actually, three aspects such as transparency, neutrality and
non-discrimination are important characteristics that are required in process of bidder selection.
Firstly, transparency in PPP projects can be achieved through information sharing. It means that
government should ensure related information of PPP projects are made available to all
organizations and individuals who are interested in. Moreover, they should be supplied the right of
access to that information easily. Therefore, interested parties such as  the  media,  end users,  trade
unions, investors, and etc should  be  able  to  know about the contents of the contract clearly. As a
result, it will improve participation and monitoring of stakeholders during lifecycle of PPP projects.
For example, In Canada,  independent party - third party assesses whether a procurement  process is
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fair, equitable, and appropriate and provides  results of the assessment for government  sponsors,
bidders and  the  public (Europe, 2008, p.47). Transparency encourages competitive environment
for bidders so that it helps government agency and private sector entity achieve VFM of PPP
projects. Secondly, neutrality refers to clear and specific rules that prevent any interest conflict
between public and private sector in PPP projects. Moreover, the rules provide a means to complain
and monitor the implementation themselves. Whether the rules are enough to ensure neutrality in
PPP projects? Besides the rules, it is necessary to have independent domestic tribunal that can solve
complaints of bidders in case of illegality in PPP procurement. That tribunal should have the right
to correct infringements and preserve commercial opportunities. Additionally,  an  independent
monitoring  authority  and independent  auditor that have no connection to either  the  public  or  the
private parties can  play  an  important  role  in monitoring  the  implementation  of  the  rules
during bidding process. It is important to notice that the contracting authority should be completely
independent from companies that participate in bidding process, in order to avoid an interest
conflict (Europe, 2008, p.47). Thirdly, non-discrimination also plays important role to guarantee
fair oportunity for all companies that want to participate into PPP bidding process. It means that
there are more participators into this process such as large dometic companies , forgein companies
and even smaller companies. According to this, it improves competition of PPP bidding process.
On the other hand, European Investment Bank shows that transaction  costs are usually over
10% of the capital value of the projects, within cost of public sector at 3.5%, cost of winning bidder
at 3.8%, and cost of failed bidders at about 5% (Gerti Dudkin, 2005, p. 14). It is obvious that the
rate of transaction costs account for significant part of lifecycle cost of PPP projects. This concern
is how to minimize transaction costs in PPP projects effectively? The suitable answer may be a
transparent system of public administration. Actually, in many countries, legal framework of PPP
model is often very complex raises  lead to rising transaction costs (Europe, 2008, p.30). Therefore,
if government wants to improve VFM of PPP projects, it needs more innovations of legal
framework follows principle: “Investors in PPP projects need predictability and security in legal
frameworks, which means  fewer,  simpler  and  better  rules” (Europe, 2008, p.29). Obviously,
fewer,  simpler  and  better  rules will reduce the number of transactions while it enhances the
quality of transactions in PPP projects. It means that a simply and effectively legal system is a
strong tool to eliminate the bureaucracy and decrease transaction costs of PPP projects.
2.2.3.2 Principle to allocate risks effectively of PPP projects
Similarly, European Investment Bank and other researches found out a general principle to
allocate risks in PPP projects, as follows: “risk should be carried by the party which is best able to
control, manage, or mitigate that risk” (Campbell Thomson, 2005, p. 11). The final target of this
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principle is reaching optimal risk allocation lead to enhance effectiveness of PPP projects.
Theoretically, the party in the best position to manage a particular risk should be able to do so with
the lowest price lead to optimal allocation can reduce individual risk premiums and total cost of the
project (Q. Government, 2008 p. 8). Certainly, the optimal risk allocation can increase VFM of PPP
projects. However, how is the optimal risk allocation implemented in fact? Actually, risks of PPP
projects should be controlled under framework of risk management that seeks to identify, prevent,
contain and mitigate risks.  Risk management is implemented during lifecycle of PPP projects with
five stages such as risk identification, risk assessment, risk allocation, risk mitigation and
monitoring and review (Q. Government, 2008 p. 14). In the risk identification stage, a risk
workshop that has participations of many experienced technical individuals such as researchers,
managers, engineers and planners should be conducted to identify all related risks to the PPP
projects. After that, in risk assessment stage, there are two key factors such as probability of its
occurrence and impact of its consequences if it does occur. Especially, risk allocation process can
allocate responsibility base on consequences of each risk for one of contracted parties, or reach
agreement of a specified mechanism which may involve sharing the risk. This stage includes five
steps, as follows (Q. Government, 2008 p. 17):
- Step 1: Identify all project risks by using results of two above stages.
- Step 2: Identify the core services that are to be provided by government and risks can not
be allocated to the private partner.
- Step 3: Examine each remaining risk and identify those:
· government is best placed to manage
· the private party is best placed to manage
· over which neither party has control
- Step 4: Determine whether any of the remaining risks should be shared.
- Step 5: Fine tune the results of step 3 and 4, and use the contract to adjust any imbalance
between the parties.
Especially, risk mitigation stage play important role in reducing the relevant party's
exposure to the risk. It focuses on decreasing likelihood of a risk occurring and impacts of risk, if it
occur. Lastly, in monitoring and review stage, identified risks and new risks should be monitored
and reviewed while the PPP project develops and its environment changes. This process continues
during the lifecycle of the contract.
In practice, there are a variety of researches about risk management of PPP model and their
results may be suitable solutions that should be referred to save time and money during PPP
projects. For example, Greenland Government shows a standardised risk matrix framework that
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includes category, description, consequence, mitigation and allocation risks in PPP projects (Q.
Government, 2008 p. 21). This matrix framework can illustrate the range of risks that may apply to
each phase of PPP projects (Appendix 1). In other research, Bing Li and et al found out three levels
of risks in PPP model such as macro risk, meso risk and micro risk. Moreover, they also identified
four risk allocation categories of PPP model, as follows (Li Bing, 2004, p. 34):
· Risk should be allocated to the public sector, including site availability and political risks.
· Risk that should be allocated to the private sector is meso risk.
· Risk should be shared between public and private sectors. Force majeure and legislation
change that belong to the macro level risk group should be shared. Because of their nature,
public and private sectors may be not able to deal with them alone. Therefore, a shared
mechanism may be the best solution. In addition, three micro level risk factors such as lack
of commitment from public/private partner, responsibilities and risk distribution, and
authority distribution between partnerships should be shared. In fact, these risks are caused
by both sectors so that neither the public nor the private sector could manage them without
the other party’s commitment and contribution.
· Risk allocation strongly depends on individual project circumstances. Four risk factors: level
of public support, project approval and permits, contract variation and lack of experience
cannot easily be allocated to a particular party nor shared.
Generally, risk allocation in PPP projects is shown in the following table:
Table 2.3 Risk allocation in PPP projects
Risks Preferred Risk Allocation
Nationalization/expropriation
Poor political decision-making process
Political opposition
Site availability
Government stability
Public sector
Lack of commitment from public/private partner
Force majeure
Legislation change
Responsibilities and risk distribution
Authority distribution between partnerships
Shared between public and
private sector
Level of public support
Project approval and permits
Contract variation
Lack of experience
Strongly depends on individual
project circumstances
Tax regulation change
Late design changes
Residual risk
Inflation
Private sector
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Tradition of private provision of public service
Staff crisis
Third party tort liability
Influential economic events
Financial attraction of project
Level of demanding project
Different working methods
Industrial regulatory change
High financing cost
Interest rate
Organization and coordination risk
Weather
Environment
Availability of finance
Ground condition
Operational revenue below par
Financial market
Quality of workmanship
Construction cost overrun
Frequency of maintenance
Availability of labour/material
Insolvency of subcontractors/suppliers
Low operating productivity
Design deficiency
Unproven engineering techniques
Operation cost overrun
Higher maintenance cost
Construction time delay
Source: adapted from Bing Li, p. 20
2.2.3.3 Principles to guarantee social benefit of PPP projects
Under PPP model, while governments focus on public interests, private sectors focus on
economic benefit. How is balance of benefit between public and private sectors kept? Obviously,
goals of PPP projects have to be determined comprehensively for ensuring this balance. According
to United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, a principle is shown as follows  “The PPP
process  requires  coherent policies  that  lay  down  clear  objectives and principles,  identifies
projects, sets  realistic  targets and  the means of achieving  them” (Europe, 2008, p.18).
The principle shows that governments should determine clear goals and objectives  in  their PPP
policies sufficiently, including both financial and non-financial targets. Because public services  are
not  commercial products, commercial criterias can not  substitute  the  public  interest  goals  in
public services. Financial targets must be combined with non-financial targets to draw a
comprehensive picture about PPP model. It means that PPP policies of governments should focus
on VFM with strong social objectives.
Part III: Experiences of application of PPP models in some countries
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2.3.1 The United Kingdom – UK experiences
In 1992, UK Government introduced a form of PPP model that called Private Finance
Initiative (PFI). It has become a major way to procure public sector infrastructure (Coulson, 2008,
p. 483). Under PFI, supply of public services is improved by private partners in the design,
construction, financing and operator of the related infrastructures to increase quality of public
services (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p. 15). Moreover, PFI contract is an agreement between a
government agency and a vehicle company called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that was set up by
private companies. The SPV is a legal entity and a purpose-built organization for one project that
has a limited lifespan (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p. 16). It is important to notice that banks supply
capital for PFI at 80 percent and later on up to 90 – 95 percent of total capital requirement (D. A.
Stephen J. Bailey, 2009, p. 48). Therefore, the ‘credit binge’ of the 1990s and early 2000s was an
advantaged condition for private sector to develop a variety of PFI projects (Stephen J. Bailey,
2010, p. 14) in many fields such as health, education, transportation, water and sanitary, power and
energy, housing and office, police and prison, and etc (Li Bing, 2004, p. 29).
Figure 2.3 PFI contract procurement process
Source: (Li Bing, 2004, p. 26) cited from (Treasury, 1995)
OJEC: Official Journal of European Community; ITN: The Invitation to Negotiate
Procurement
Issue OJEC
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Figure 2.3 shows that contract procurement begins from the advertisement in the OJEC. A
shortlist of bidders is drawn-up and invited to submit proposals based on the information provided
by the private consortia responses. The ITN that is issued to the short-listed bidders includes
instructions to bidders, output specification, proposed contractual terms, evaluation criteria for bids,
and a risk list/matrix. At the end of ITN stage, each bidder is required to submit a ‘‘best and final
offer’’ (BAFO) that is assessed careful. Parallel discussions are required with each bidder to clarify
its proposal and assess whether it meets the output requirements. After that, the suitable bidder is
selected and a second-place bidder is reserved. Before having final negotiations, the PFI proposition
should be tested against in term of the key risk transfer, value for money and affordability criteria
established for the project (Li Bing, 2004, p. 26).
The main concern is that whether PFI application can ensure good VFM. Beside advantages
to contribute socioeconomic infrastructures in UK effectively, standard PFI model still has
disadvantages that affect on results of PFI projects. Actually, the original PFI model has been
researched in many academic and non-academic literatures (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p. 15). For
example, Ezulike et al. explored that bidding process of PFI projects spends extensive time. In
addition, PFI model requires a lot of time to negotiate terms and conditions of the PFI contract (Li
Bing, 2004, p. 25 cited from (Ezulike EI, 1997)). According to Li Bing, the most considerable
negative elements related with PFI model are ‘a lot of management time spent in the contract
transaction, lengthy delays in negotiation and high participation cost’ (Li Bing, 2004, p. 25). The
other viewpoint shows that long-term problems of standard PFI model are high transaction costs,
insufficient market competitive and expensive negotiations (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p. 21 cited
from (Hellowell M., 2009)). Obviously, standard PFI model has poor VFM.
Moreover, credit crunch in the period between 2007 and 2009 had negative effects on
private finance, especially capital for PFI projects. During this period, global economic downturn
and state gave unprecedented  multi-billion  pound  bailouts  for  banks  and the  finance system
moved  from  highly  speculative  lending  to  a  considerable decrease in availability of  finance (D.
A. Stephen J. Bailey, 2009, p. 48). Even after credit crunch, multiple investors instead of only one
or two banks invest in PFI projects within typical reduce in lifecycle of financing agreement from
25-30 to 7-10 years. In general speaking, banks are unwilling  to  invest a huge capital in a single
transaction lead to PFI projects have to find other participants to  provide  the  rest  of  the  capital
requirement. Therefore, financing process of PFI projects has become slower and more uncertain
than before (D. A. Stephen J. Bailey, 2009, p. 49).
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It is obvious that long-term problems of standard PFI model and credit crunch seem to be
the motivation for reforming of original model to reach more effectiveness, especially improving
VFM of PFI projects. Actually, standard PFI model is renewed by modifying some aspects while
preserving its main characteristics (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p. 16). There are some new versions of
PFI model such as Non-Profit Distribution (NPD) model, the Hub initiative, LIFT and Express
LIFT and etc:
- NPD model focuses on improving original PFI while maintaining an effective risk transfer.
On one hand, NPD caps ‘excessive’ profits of private sector, reduces business rate and tax
liabilities. Moreover, any surpluses are passed to charitable company to distribute back to the
community. Contrastingly, standard PFI model does not restrict on profits of private sector and any
surpluses are paid for the SPV members. It is obvious that NPD brings more social benefits. On the
other hand, NPD retains an optimum allocation of risk between public and private sectors, for
example whole-life costing, life-cycle maintenance and facilities management and improved overall
service provision (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.p. 18-19). Because of more social benefits and
optimum risk allocation, NPD model seems to enhance VFM of projects.
- The Hub initiative is a flexible and pragmatic approach to invest finance for projects. It
increases devolution of decision-making powers at a local level rather than departmental level and
amalgamate different types of public projects to meet requirements of local users in a more
comprehensive ‘join-up’ way. At local level, Hub companies were set up between a variety of local
sponsors who understand about requirements of local users and development needs for local
socioeconomic growth. Under the Hub initiative, more and more services are supplied locally in
communities through multi-disciplinary teams working from single sites (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010,
p.p.25-29). Therefore, projects can delivery more quickly and effectively. Moreover, local public
agencies also participate into Hub companies so that Hub initiative can reduce transactions during
procedure process of projects. It means that the Hub initiative can limit transaction costs
considerably. As a result, the Hub initiative can improve VFM of projects.
2.3.2 Experiences of South Korea
The rapidly economic growth of Korea requires a dramatically huge capital to invest in
developments of infrastructure. Therefore, Korea government utilizes private finance to compensate
for capital requirements. In 1994, Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) as a type of PPP
model was introduced in Korea. PPI has focused on cooperation between public and private sector
to invest in infrastructures (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.38). South Korea has rapidly adopted and
improved PPI model lead to it become second country that applies PPP model considerably after the
UK (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.56).
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After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, government introduced Minimum Revenue
Guarantees (MRGs) to boost private investment however it includes danger with little VFM. As a
result, there are an excessive number of infrastructural investments with low VFM and high burden
on the public finance in PPI projects. Therefore, government reformed MRGs mechanism in 2006
and then replaced MRGs mechanism with an alternative cost reimbursement scheme (Stephen J.
Bailey, 2010, p.56).
On one hand, Korea government encourages development of applying PPI model by
incentives such as tax benefits, land expropriation, infrastructure credit guarantees and
compensation on termination and for bidding (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.44). On the other hand,
government also wants to enhance VFM of PPI projects. Thus government established the Public
Investment Management Center (PIMAC) that executes pre-feasibility studies, re-assesses studies
of feasibility and supports government in improving polities and plans for applying PPI model,
especially conducting VFM tests:
- Pre- feasibility studies (PFS) are short and brief evaluations that support for budgetary
decision. The main purpose of PFS is enhancing fiscal productivity base on transparent and
objective ex-ante project evaluations. It is important to notice that PFS only is implemented in
projects with total costs to 50 billion won or more, or with subsidy of central government over 30
billion won (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.47).
- VMF test was introduced in Korea in 2005. The final target of the test is that projects
should be pursued when they can achieve VFM. The test includes three main phases. In first phase,
feasibility study is done to consider the worth about social benefit before decision to invest in a
project. In second phase, VFM is assessed for decision to implement through PPI. In last phase, PPI
alternative is formulated as a best implementation practice (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.46).
- Public sector comparator test is used to improve VFM. The test involves three main stages.
The first stage is a benefit-cost analysis (B/C). If B/C > 1, the second stage as VFM test is done. If
VFM > 0, it means PPI projects have more cost effective than traditional procedure. The final stage
is identifying the optimal cost, toll level, fiscal support and etc (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.47).
3. The three main targeted PPP projects in Vietnam
3.1 Application of three main targeted PPP models in Vietnam
Figure 3.1.1 Implementing process of three main targeted PPP projects in Vietnam
36
Source: Adapted from Decree 108 in the year of 2009 of Vietnam Government about Investment in
form of Build - Operate - Transfer, Build - Transfer - Operate and Build - Transfer contracts.
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Figure 3.1.1 illustrates implementing process of a PPP project in Vietnam. All three targeted
PPP projects have to be researched their feasibility by public or private sector. If the projects need
from 200 hectare land or require total investment capital more than 1500 billion VND, The Prime
Minister will approve feasibility studies of these projects. In other cases, ministers or presidents
of the People's Committee approve feasibility studies of the projects. If  approved projects that have
feasibility studies done by public sector, they are aggregated in the annual lists to publish for
attracting investment of private sector. Almost three targeted PPP projects are implemented in this
way in Vietnam. Beside that, private sector can propose new projects and research feasibility of
new projects by itself. In next stage, government authority selects suitable investor through the
bidding process or the appointment of contractor. It is important to notice that government
establishs a group of people that includes representatives of government authority and central/local
government, and some experts in field of the project in every PPP project. This group has to support
government authority in negotiating for contract and solving problems in the project. Actually,
because of complexation of  administrative procedure in Vietnam, establishment of this group takes
a lot of time. Especially, private partners in three targeted PPP projects in Vietnam are required
their investment licenses before they begin to implement these projects. Ministry of Planning and
Investment will issue investment licenses for PPP projects at central level while Department of
Planning and Investment in every province will issue investment licenses for PPP projects at local
level.
3.1.1 Three targeted PPP models in Vietnam
PPP model was introduced in Vietnam by Vietnam government in the year of 1993. This
introduction included only one variance of PPP model, namely Build- Operate- Transfer (BOT).
Moreover, only foreign investors were allowed to become private partners in BOT projects (V.
Government, 1993). Four years later, Vietnam government issued one more Decree about
investment through BOT of domestic investors (V. Government, 1997). It is obvious that both
foreign and domestic investors had fair opportunities to become private partners in supplying public
facilities and related services. In 1998, Vietnam government supplemented two more different
forms of PPP model that only applied to foreign investors, including Build – Transfer – Operator
(BTO) and Build – Transfer (BT) (V. Government, 1998). In the next year, this Decree was
modified (V. Government, 1999). Until that time, domestic investors only used BOT while foreign
investors had chance to apply three variants of PPP model, involve BOT, BTO and BT. In 2007,
Vietnam Government issued a new Decree that allowed both foreign and domestic investors to join
in BOT, BTO and BT contracts (V. Government, 2007). However, a different Decree in 2009
replaced it to improve participation of private sector into supplying public services (V. Government,
38
2009). Generally, Vietnam has used three forms of PPP model such as BOT, BTO and BT to attract
private capital to invest public infrastructures and related services. It is obvious that legal
framework of these schemes seems to be unstable and changes quickly.
Figure 3.1.2 BOT model in Vietnam
A BOT project in Vietnam is a long-term cooperation between private sector and
government authority that builds and operates a public facility and then supplies related services. At
the end of BOT contract, the facility is transferred back to government without compensation.
Under BOT scheme, revenues of projects come from the user’s fees to compensate for capital
investments of private sector.
Figure 3.1.3 BTO model in Vietnam
In BTO scheme, private sector cooperates with government authority to build public
infrastructures after that the infrastructures return to government. In addition, government will
allow private sector to operate the infrastructures period of time to recover capital and profits.
Obviously, there are a variety of similar points between BOT and BTO schemes in Vietnam,
as follows:
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- This is long-term cooperation between public and private sectors
- Private sectors invest capital to build public facilities
- Private sectors operate these facilities and provide related services for end users
- Investments of private sectors are returned in terms of user fees
- The public facilities transfer to government
However, there is a considerably different point is the time of transferring facilities:
- In BOT scheme, the facilities are transferred to government at the end of BOT contract.
Moreover, private sectors have main responsibility during operating stage of projects. After period
of operating, private sectors transfer the facilities to public sector.
- In BTO scheme, the facilities are transferred to government after building stage. The right
to control the facilities belongs to government. Government allows private sectors to operate the
facilities as a lease under government controls. It means government has more controls than BOT
scheme.
Figure 3.1.4 BT model in Vietnam
BT scheme is final variance of PPP model in Vietnam in which private sectors invest
finance to build public facilities base on requirements of end users. After building stage, the
facilities are transferred to government. The biggest difference between BT and other two schemes
is that government will pay costs that are equivalent to private investment, or allow private sector
implement other projects to recover capital and gain profits. Moreover, end users pay fees if it is
necessary to government.
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From the first Decree to Decree in 2009 about applying PPP model in Vietnam, government
has usually encouraged private sectors to join in supplying public infrastructures and related
services in term of various advantageous tax schemes and other incentives as follows:
- BOT, BTO and BT companies are called PPP companies that entitled to a payment of
business income tax (BIT) at the maximum rate of 10% for the period of 15 years while other
companies must pay BIT at 25%, especially this rate of oil and gas businesses is 35% or 50% ((N.
Assembly, 2008), (V. Government, 2003) and (V. Government, 2007a)).
- PPP companies are exempted from payment of BIT for the first 4 years from the
company’s first profit-making year, followed by a 50% reduction in BIT for the next 9 years (V.
Government, 2003).
- PPP companies are entitled for an import duty exemption on goods are used to create
assets of the project equipment, including machinery and specialized vehicles, fuel, raw materials
and other kind of supplies used for the PPP project(V. Government, 2009).
- PPP companies are exempted from rent fee of land where project is implemented in the
whole of the project(V. Government, 2009).
- PPP companies are guaranteed that they are supplied public services fully (V. Government,
2009). There is a notice that developing countries like Vietnam do not have enough abilities to
provide public services for socioeconomic development comprehensively. Therefore, it is an
obvious incentive.
- Industrial property rights, technical know-how, technological process and technical
services of PPP companies are protected.
In Vietnam, BOT is the most popular scheme while BTO is less used.
3.1.2 Achievements of three targeted PPP models in infrastructure development
Infrastructure of Vietnam has development quickly and contributed to reduce the
infrastructure deficit that Vietnam has faced since the early 1990s. According to World Bank,
system of infrastructure in Vietnam reaches a variety of achievements as follows (Bank, 2006, pp.
5-6):
- The road network has increased from 96100 km in 1990 to 205,782 km in 2002. In this
network, national level roads expanded from 15,100 km with 36.6% in good condition in 1997 to
17,300 km with 44.8% in good condition in 2002.
- The number of population who can access to improved water grew from 26% to 57%
between 1993 and 2004, within 48% of rural households and 82% of urban households having
access in 2004.
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- The rate of population who can access to hygienic latrines grew from 10% to 31% between
1993 and 2004, with rural access at 16% and urban access at 76% of the population in 2004.
- The number of fixed and mobile lines per 100 people increased from 1.08 in 1995 to
around 20 in 2005.
- All urban areas in Vietnam are electrified. In rural areas, electrification grew from 51% to
88% of households between 1996 and 2004.
It is important to notice that private contribution into above achievements is considerable.
Increasingly, three targeted PPP models become good methods to attract capital from both foreign
and domestic private sector. Firstly, World Bank shows that the rate of private contribution was
21% of investment finance in 2006 (Bank, 2006, p.20) within huge contribution of BOT, BTO and
BT projects.
Figure 3.1.5 Infrastructure investment financing mechanism in Vietnam
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Secondly, the statistics of Vietnam Foreign Investment Agency shows that in 2011 there are 14
valid BOT, BTO and BT projects that are invested by foreign investors (Agency, 2011). Obviously,
private financing through PPP model seems to become one of main financial ways for building
public facilities and supplying related services. Until now, Vietnam has had more than 100
infrastructure projects implemented under BOT, BTO and BT schemes (Stephen Ogunlana, 2009, p.
65). Beside increasing quantity of BOT, BTO and BT projects, another concern is quality of these
projects, especially VFM of the projects.
3.2 Value for money in using three main targeted PPP models in Vietnam
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Three aspects are lifecycle costs, risk transfer and social benefits that are considered to
determine VFM of BOT, BTO and BT projects.
Lifecycle costs:
Firstly, lifecycle costs of three targeted PPP projects in Vietnam that called PPP projects are
considered in term of cost overrun. Actually, a variety of infrastructure projects in Vietnam has
undergone cost overrun has not finished projects on time, including some PPP projects (Stephen
Ogunlana, 2009, p. 73). For example, a BOT project about building Lien Khuong highway in Lam
Dong Province. The highway connects Dalat city and Lien Khuong airport. This project is invested
by Company 7/5 that belongs to Defence Ministry. At the beginning of the project in 2003, total
capital was 572 425 million VND within 377 520 million VND was capital of private partner. In
addition, the signed BOT contract showed that this highway completed in January 2007. However,
there was increase in real total capital of this project at 631 913 million VND in which private
capital was 437 008 million VND in 2004. Continuously, some investment items of the project were
modified and some new others were added lead to portfolio of the project changed considerably in
August 2007. As a result, total capital rose at 933 662 million VND that was approximately 1.6
times more expensive than costs in the first agreement in 2003 ((province, 2003), (province, 2004)
and (province, 2007)). It is obvious that the project did not complete on time and had dramatic costs
overrun. The main reason is insufficient feasibility study of the project and inability to identify all
the factors that have negative impacts towards the project, thus making the project difficult to be
kept under control. Because of insufficient feasibility study, portfolio of the project is not
determined comprehensively so that there are some modifications and additions. According to this,
time for building this highway is extended; and transaction costs for reforming the project are
considerable contribution in cost overrun. Beside that, both local government and private partner
have not enough ability to assess effects of macro factors on the project, especially inflation.
According to Vietnam centre for economic and policy research, inflation in Vietnam reached high
levels in 2004, 2007 and 2008 at 9.5%, 12.6% and 20% respectively (Nguyen Thi Thu Hang, 2010,
p. 10). Inflation made cost escalation of the project become more serious.
Secondly, transaction costs are important factor that influences lifecycle cost of PPP
projects strongly. Transaction costs are the costs of writing ‘watertight’ contracts (Stephen J.
Bailey, 2010, p.33). Particularly, transaction costs of projects  are very high in countries as Vietnam
where have bureaucratic administration systems, and cumbersome and un-transparent procedures.
In fact, Vietnam government agencies do not usually grant approvals of projects on time and
sometimes they even cancel those that had been approved before. Therefore, project approval
process in Vietnam  is often very  time-consuming lead to delay on the overall project development
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process and impair financial ability of project. For example, in 2011, Mong Duong 2 thermal power
BOT project stared to implement in Quang Ninh province with a total investment of 1.95 billion
USD. 100% capital of this project belongs to private sectors, including AES Corporation (The
United State), Posco Power (Korea), China Investment Corporation (China) with the proportions of
capital contribution are 51%, 30% and 19% respectively. Obviously, these private sectors come
from different countries where have undergone application of PPP model in infrastructure
investment. However, they must spend nearly six years to negotiate and prepare contract of the
project (H. Nguyen, 2011). Certainly, investors of the project have to pay a lot of money for
transaction costs.
Generally speaking, most PPP projects in Vietnam fall into the situation in which the total
cost overruns due to the high level of transaction costs.
Risk allocation
In fact, there has been no explicit identification and allocation practice of project risks for
PPP projects in Vietnam. Consequently, Vietnam government has to take most risks from PPP
projects. For example, Vietnam Bridge and Road Association shows that 70-80% of the large
transport projects on BOT or BT schemes was distorted and they are not still
BOT or BT projects. Some important projects are moved to the State budget (Phung, 2011). Due to
lack of allocation risk researches, some PPP projects can not balance interests between investors
and the local government. As a result, there are negative impacts on end users. Typically, the charge
of Binh Trieu BOT project made inconvenient for traffic at the gateway of Ho Chi Minh City so
that local government have finally acquired the project (Phung, 2011).
Beside that, due to the shortage of risk framework in PPP projects,  it is difficult for both
Vietnam government and private investors  to  maximize  the  efficiency  and  minimize  costs  of
PPP  projects  through  risk management. On one hand, government can not ensure greater VFM in
three targeted PPP models than conventional procurement process. On the other hand, the lack of
suitable and efficient risk management can create government budget pressure during construction
phase, if private partners require unexpected and sudden supports of government, especially
financial guarantees of government.
It is important to notice that policy risks contribute to rise in delay and cost overrun.
Moreover, the policy risk for PPP projects in Vietnam is allocated unsuitably. Actually, many
policies of Vietnam government are unstable and change quickly while their results influence
private partners in PPP projects strongly. For example, in the case of Binh Trieu 2 Bridge and Road
BOT project, at first, total costs of the project was 41 billion VND with 11-year concession period.
When the provincial committees changed their planning policies to widen the road from 32m to
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53m However, total costs of the project was grown up to 1,600 billion VND and the concession
period was extended to 25 years. This was a big financial challenge that private sector must face.
Generally, Vietnam does not interest in risks of PPP projects fully and risk allocation in
these projects is ineffective.
Social benefits
The final purpose of three targeted PPP projects in Vietnam is to meet requirements of end
users and contributing socioeconomic growth of nation. However, Vietnam government does not
have much experience and knowledge on application of PPP model in infrastructure investment.
Even government authorities at national and provincial level currently implement projects through
three types of PPP variants. They have a shortage of governmental officials with the training and
experience required for managing PPP projects within complexity of the contracts and associated
negotiations. Therefore, unexpected results may appear during lifecycle of the projects. According
to Vietnam Bridge and Road Association, when building the infrastructure, especially transport, in
the form of BOT, BT and BTO contracts must note this on the effectiveness society (Phung, 2011).
For example, Co May Bridge BOT Project was implemented by Hai Chau Company and
Directorate for Roads of Vietnam. Private investors were allowed collecting user fees in the period
of 15 years while there was the fact that private investors only need five years to recover their
capital investment. Therefore, it is considered a project "super profits" for private investors in the
transport sector (Giang, 2010). Obviously, revenue of government budget reduced in 10 years. It
means that social benefits were affected because of shortage of this revenue. This proves that weak
management skill of government in PPP projects makes social benefits decrease.
Research questions
The main research question:
How can the three targeted PPP models can be implemented more effectively in terms of
value for money in Vietnam?
The sub-questions:
1. What is VFM of projects implementing the three targeted PPP models?
2. What is level of VFM in using projects implementing the three targeted PPP models?
3. How should the Vietnamese government secure greater VFM in using the three targeted
PPP models in Vietnam?
4. How and what should the Vietnamese government learn from the existing value for
money of the three main targeted models and other PPP models in other countries?
4. Research methodology
4.1. Research method
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Because of a number of strong reasons, a qualitative method is chosen to study this topic.
Firstly, this method can help researchers better understand government policies such as identifying
unanticipated outcomes of policies, and finding internal  inconsistencies and conflicts of policies
lead to debug limits of policies (Marsall, p. 15). It is very suitable for this thesis to research on
government policies have relationships with using PPP model in Vietnam. Secondly, qualitative
research is a flexible method which allows greater spontaneity and adaptation of the interaction
between researchers and study participants in the research(Natasha Mack, 2005, p. 4). For example,
qualitative method requires researchers to use open-ended questions that allow participants to
present their own opinions and experiences. This is a useful characteristic for participants to
respond more elaborately and in greater detail than is typically the case with quantitative methods.
Therefore, it is convenient to find out answers for “how” questions of this thesis. Finally, data
format of this thesis is textual so qualitative method is a suitable choice to collect and analyze data.
In scope of this thesis, two main research instruments, namely documentary content analysis
and in-depth interview are used for researching.
4.2. Research instruments and data analysis
- Documentary content analysis: “Content analysis is any research technique for making
influences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristic within the text”
(Neuendort, 2002 p.10 cited (Philip J. Stone, 1966 p.5)). According to this, documentary content
analysis is a research technique which analyzes documentary data. Because almost data relates with
PPP application in Vietnam stores on documents, it is suitable to use this method for collecting and
analyzing data in the thesis.
- In-depth interviews is defined as “a qualitative research technique that involves conducting
intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on
a particular idea, program, or situation”(Boyce, 2006, p. 3). Actually, a few public agencies are
tasked to implement some types of PPP model in Vietnam so that only these agencies experience
application of PPP model. In this case, an in-depth interview is a suitable instrument for gaining
opinion of these agencies about using PPP model. According to this, the thesis should involve this
instrument to find out answers of sub research questions 3 and 4.
The  aim  of  the  study  is  achieving  VFM  of  PPP  project.  VFM  is  defined:  “VFM  is  the  optimum
combination of the whole life and sufficient quality to meet the user’s requirements and investment
objectives” (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.46). “VFM is associated in reducing life cycle costs; provide
better allocation of risk, faster implementation, improved service quality and generating high
revenue of the project outcomes” (Kharizam Ismail., 2011). Therefore, in case of PPP project, VFM
is associated in minimizing transaction cost, achieving effective risk transfer and improving PPP
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contribution to socioeconomic development. In the first aspect, transaction cost is analyzed to find
out the way reduce this cost if possible. Transaction costs are costs of establishing and maintaining
a public – private – partnership, including legal, financial, and technical costs of both public and
private sectors in all phases of a PPP project (Gerti Dudkin, 2005). In PPP project, three features of
contract such as bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity should be analyzed carefully
to limit arising of transaction cost. In the second aspect, the key concern is risk transfer from public
sector to private sector. Actually, it is very difficult to transfer risks. For example, when
government uses PPP models, it hopes that risk is transferred from public sector to private sector.
However, if government guarantees for sponsors to loan and uncertainties occur in life-cycle of
project, risk will return to public sector. In the last aspect, it is necessary to consider contributions
of PPP projects into socioeconomic development. This is the basis that helps government choose
suitable PPP projects to implement and gain more contributions of these projects.
4.3. Research design
In scope of the thesis, documentary content analysis and an in-depth interview are used to
collect data and explore VFM of PPP model in Vietnam.
Firstly, in case of Vietnam, documentary content analysis can collects data from three main
sources such as Vietnam government, international reputable organizations and prestigious
magazines. Moreover, the data is various, including laws, reports, newspapers, books, database,
assessments and results of some researches relate PPP model in Vietnam. In fact, the data is
gathered from the library of Tampere, national library of Vietnam, library of Lam Dong province in
Vietnam and websites of Vietnam government agencies, international reputable organizations and
prestigious magazines on the internet. After that, the collected data is reviewed, analyzed and
discussed for determining VFM level of PPP projects in Vietnam.
Secondly, an in-depth interview is designed to collect information from public agencies that
underwent really implementing PPP model in Vietnam. The interview is undertaken follow a semi-
structured format. According to Canada government, semi-structured interview is suitable for small
samples, studying particular situations, supplementing and validating information that is collected
from other sources to reach safe diagnoses (Laforest, 2009, p. 1). Therefore, semi-structured format
seems a good tool to get information of practical experiences for supporting results of documentary
content analysis. The questionnaire of the interview includes 10 questions that are divided into three
main parts (Appendix 2). The first part involves background questions about the individual and
organisational information of respondents. The second part investigates VFM and difficulties to
achieve VFM in PPP model, according to practical experiences of direct respondents. The third part
gathers recommendations of respondents to improve VFM of PPP model in Vietnam.
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In scope of the interview, the sampling technique focuses on convenience samples such as
people who have more practical experiences about PPP application rather than random sample.
Obviously, people who underwent implementing PPP model can give related information more
quickly and exactly. Therefore, the validity of data interview can be improved lead to reasonable
inference. In fact, direct interviews – face to face interviews are done in three administrative
agencies of Lam Dong province in Vietnam such as Department of Planning and Investment,
Department of Finance, and Department of Transport. The main reason why three agencies are
chosen is that they have more experiences about implementing PPP projects. Firstly, Department of
Planning and Investment has important roles in calling investment, approving and controlling PPP
application projects in jurisdiction of local government. Secondly, Department of Finance manages
local public expenditures within include public finance for PPP projects. Finally, in Vietnam,
Department of Transport has extensive experiences in performing PPP projects because transport
field is encouraged attracting investment by PPP model strongly.
4.4 Interview results
Actually, the time for interviewing was approximately 60 minutes per unit and respondents
of all agencies closely cooperated with interviewer in supplying related information. In Lam Dong
Department of Transport, interviewer worked face to face with vice-manager of Office of planning
and finance that has responsibility to build and implement a variety of transport projects in Lam
Dong province, including both traditional procedure and PPP projects. Besides that, interviewer
worked directly with manager of Office of Basic construction and Appraisal  belong to Lam Dong
Department of Planning and Investment that considers feasible characteristic of projects, include
PPP projects and then decides whether these project should be implemented or not. This department
also has other important duties such as looking for potential investors and controlling
implementation of PPP projects. Similarly, in Lam Dong Department of Finance, interviewer
worked with manager of Office of Investment that has responsibility to implement financial
management policies of government about investment infrastructure in Lam Dong province,
especially financial policies for preparing investment and land acquisition. These are important
policies that influence PPP projects strongly. In short, all respondents have practical experiences
about PPP projects so that their information can be valid and useful to contribute exploring VFM of
three target PPP models in Vietnam.
The detailed results of the interview are shown in Appendix 3, 4 and 5. A summarized result
of the interview is displayed in Table 4.1 that includes practical experiences of respondents about
applying PPP model, viewpoints of respondents about VFM of PPP projects and some their
recommendations.
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Table 4.1 Summarized result of the interview
Aspects Lam Dong Department
of Transport
Lam Dong Department
of Planning and
Investment
Lam Dong Department
of Finance
Types of PPP
schemes that it
underwent
- BOT scheme
- BT scheme
- BOT scheme
- BT scheme
- BOT scheme
- BT scheme
Difficulties in
implementing PPP
projects
- Can not determine all
related risks of the
projects during process
of feasibility study
- Face difficulties due
to lack of general
framework of risk
management
- Can not understand
clearly about risks in
all different fields.
Therefore, approval
process of the projects
meets many
difficulties
- have not enough
ability to assess
feasibility study of the
projects
comprehensively lead
to some of the projects
are ineffective.
- Policies of applying
PPP model change
quickly
- It meets a lot of
difficulties in process of
land acquisition because
differences policies
between different
provinces or/and un-
cooperation of people
Viewpoint about
VFM
- VFM relates to
economic effects of the
projects. For example,
saving capital
- VFM relates to
contributions of the
projects for socio-
economic development
- Benefit of the
projects is more than
the costs that invest for
them
- The projects must
save money and ensure
benefit of end users
- The projects finish on
time
- The projects achieve all
their own objectives
Factors that affect
on VFM
- Competitive
environment
- Inflation
Knowledge of officers
who appraise the
feasibility studies of
the projects
- Limited abilities of
officers
- Unstable policies for
applying PPP model
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VFM level of PPP
projects in Vietnam
High average Low Low
Recommendation - Determine risks
belong to transport
field in Lam Dong
province
- Improve skills of
implementing and
monitoring the projects
for officers
- Contribute ideals for
building national
framework of risk
management
- Shorten the approval
process and time for
giving investment
licences.
- Encourage officers to
improve their
knowledge about PPP
model
- Recommend
government to train
officers who
participate into the
projects
- Build suitable prices of
land acquisition
- Recommend
government to build
effective policies about
applying PPP model and
these policies should be
stable in long-term
period
Data from the interview shows that respondents actually have experiences in implement PPP
projects under BOT and BT schemes. Moreover, they also mention challenges that they meet in
PPP projects. Firstly, Department of Transport plays role as government authority in PPP contracts
of transport projects. In almost cases of PPP projects in transport field, this department builds
feasibility study of the projects. The respondent said that officers of this department can not
determine all related risks during feasibility studying and the projects include participations of
private sector that makes complexity of the projects increasingly. Therefore, feasibility study
process of the projects is difficult and takes a lot of time. What should this department do to
improve this situation? Perhaps, participation of private sector in feasibility study is suitable. It
means that this department should hire a private consulting company to implement feasibility study
of the PPP projects. It is clear that private consulting companies have more experiences than
government authorities in PPP projects. Therefore, feasibility study process becomes simpler with
government authorities. Beside that, central government should hold national conferences within
assessments of successes and failures of PPP projects that were implemented in Vietnam. Through
these conferences, both public and private sectors can increase their experiences in three targeted
PPP projects in Vietnam. Simultaneously, Vietnam government should encourage researches about
risks of PPP projects. Results of these researches can attract public sector to interest in risks of PPP
projects and support public and private sectors to determine related risks and find out effective risk
allocations in PPP projects quicker. As a result, it can save time in the process of PPP projects.
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Secondly, other government agencies such as Department of Planning and Investment and
Department of Finance also meet a lot of difficulties such as limited abilities of officers, and
unstable, insufficient and ineffective policies. In Vietnam, there are 63 Departments of Planning and
Investment and 63 Departments of Finance that belong to 63 local governments. In every province,
these two departments have important roles in appraising PPP projects before president of the
People's Committee approve them. The respondent of Departments of Planning and Investment said
that abilities of officers are limit and they can not assess feasibility studies comprehensively.
Therefore, they can have wrong decisions lead to ineffective projects are implemented. In addition,
the respondent of Department of Finance mentioned that PPP policies in Vietnam are unstable,
insufficient and ineffective so it takes a lot of time of this department, especially in process of land
acquisition. For example, each province in Vietnam has its own different policy of land acquisition.
Actually, prices of provincial governments are often lower than markets’ price so people do not
want to leave away from their houses. It means that process of land acquisition faces with non-
cooperation of people. The problem will become more serious if the projects spread in many
provinces. In Vietnam, this problem is one of the main reasons why projects of building
infrastructure often delay. In fact, legal framework for three targeted PPP schemes is changed
quickly. In the period of 17 years, Vietnam government issued six Decrees about application three
targeted PPP schemes and a variety of different guidelines of government while PPP models require
long-term time to implement. Moreover, the system of Vietnam administrative procedures is
complicated while the relationships between government departments are weak. As a result, it raises
risks in the projects and fear of private investors when they want to join in the projects.
On the other hand, viewpoints of respondents about VFM are unclear and insufficient.
Moreover, each department has specific viewpoint. For example, respondent in Department of
Transport said that VFM relates lowest costs of the projects that are not whole life costs of the
projects. The other respondent said that VFM of PPP projects is achieved when benefit of the
projects is more than their costs. However, he did not explain whether the costs are initial costs or
the whole life costs. Furthermore, they mentions a variety of factors that affects on VFM such as
competition, inflation, limited abilities of officers, unstable policies and lack of general framework
of risk management. However, they did not give the way that these factors influence on VFM. All
respondents also assessed that VFM level of PPP projects is not high. In fact, Vietnam government
does not mention VFM of PPP model in its policies. Obviously, Vietnam government only focuses
on increasing the number of PPP projects while it forgets the level of VFM. As a result, some of
PPP projects may be ineffective in Vietnam. Therefore, it is very necessary to improve quality of
PPP projects, especially focusing on VFM. According to the respondents, under PPP projects in
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Vietnam, there are two important aspects that should be innovated such as improving abilities of
officers and reforming policies of government for solving difficulties and achieving VFM of PPP
projects. Actually, they recommended some ideals that are necessary to be considered as presented
below:
- Officers are encouraged to improve their knowledge about applying PPP model effectively
such as they are trained about PPP model and they can learn practical experiences from successful
PPP projects in Vietnam and other countries. Is this scheme feasible in fact? Actually, it is hard for
this scheme to be implemented because of two main reasons. Firstly, government must spend a lot
of budget and time to hold training courses for all officers in central and local governments.
Moreover, some of officers typically use knowledge gained from these training courses only “once
in a life time” and most officers have never used this knowledge. It is clear that organizing these
training courses is ineffective. Secondly, these training courses can not be updated knowledge about
quick changes of socio-economic developments of country, especially developing country like
Vietnam. The complexity of PPP projects simultaneously increases with socio-economic
developments. This is second reason explains why the training courses for all officers about PPP
model are ineffective. What is solution for limited abilities of public officers? The answer is that
Vietnam government should establish organization that is similar to Scottish Futures Trust and hold
national conferences within assessments of successes and failures of PPP projects in Vietnam. In
the year of 2008, the Scottish Government established Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) as an
independent company to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure investment in
Scotland through for achieving better value for money and ultimately public services (Trust, 2008).
The SFT have two separate parts namely SFT Development and Delivery and SFT Finance and
Investment. SFT Development and Delivery that would sit in public sector includes investment
partner, quality assurer, developer and deliverer of projects. And the other part of SFT that would
be allocated in private sector is as a finance arranger or investor in projects (Stephen J. Bailey,
2010, p. 127 cited from (S. Government, 2008, p. 13)). The staffs of SFT are experts who have
experience of working with the private sector and elsewhere public sector contracts with private
sector building and facilities management companies and banks. Actually, they underwent PPP
projects in the whole of the public sector in Scotland. During period between 2010 and 2011, the
SFT achieved £129 million of independently verified benefits and savings to infrastructure in
Scotland (Trust, 2011, p. 18). Therefore, the SFT could be used as a benchmark solution for
Vietnam to solve the problem of limited abilities of officers.
- Central government should issue national framework of risk management with database of
risks in PPP projects. This framework is very useful for implementing PPP projects. For example,
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government authority can save time and money in process of feasibility study by using this
framework. In addition, successful changes of the projects can be increased because almost related
risks of the projects can be determined easily. This ideal of respondents is good however building
national framework of risk management is an actually expensive way. In Vietnam, the number of
PPP projects is less than the number of traditional procedure projects considerably. It means that the
frequency of using this framework is low. Therefore, building this framework is large waste of
money so Vietnam should not build it. Government should organize conferences about
implementing PPP projects in which public and private sectors can exchange practical experiences
in Vietnam. These conferences can encourage public sectors think about risks and results of these
conferences can be benchmarks for new PPP projects in the future. Moreover, Vietnam can apply
the lesson from Korea where PPP projects have optimal cost. According to this, Vietnam should
focus on framework of benefit-cost analysis of PPP projects and assessment process to choose
suitable form for public projects. In Korea, assessment process includes three main stages. The first
stage is a benefit-cost analysis (B/C). If B/C > 1, the second stage as VFM test is done. If VFM > 0,
it means PPP projects have more cost effective than traditional procedure. The final stage is
identifying the optimal cost, toll level, fiscal support and etc (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.47).
- In terms of reforming government policies, respondents said that related policies of
government should be stable in long-term period. Moreover, the policies should be simpler, clearer
and more sufficient. This is important condition to implement PPP projects because “Investors in
PPP projects need predictability and security in legal frameworks, which means  fewer,  simpler
and  better  rules” (Europe, 2008, p.29). Additionly, respondent suggested that provincal
governments should increase the prices of land acquisition to be similar with market prices. As a
result, people can accept the prices more easily lead to process of land acquisition may be on time.
This is a good ideal. Because it can guarantee benefits of people who live in land acquisition and
contribute to finish PPP projects on time.
5. Results
5.1. Results for sub-question 1
Sub-question 1: What is VFM of projects implementing the three targeted PPP in models?
VFM is defined as “the effective use of public funds on a capital project, can come from the
private sector innovation and skills in asset design, construction techniques and operational
practices, and also from transferring key risks in design, construction delays, cost overruns and
finance and insurance to private sector entities” (M.K.Lewis, 2002, p. 109); or as “the optimum
combination of the whole life and sufficient quality to meet the user’s requirements and investment
objectives” (Stephen J. Bailey, 2010, p.46). VFM is core principle that is basis of PPP model.
53
In  Vietnam,  BOT,  BTO and  BT schemes  are  three  variants  of  PPP  model  that  have  been
applied popularly since the early 1990s. And BOT is the most common use among three schemes.
According to PPP theories, VFM of three schemes has to include both financial and non-financial
purposes. It means that the whole life costs of three targeted PPP projects are less expensive than
those of traditional procedure projects. In addition, risks of the projects should be allocated in
partners who have better risk management. Moreover, results of the projects have to meet
requirements of end users and contribute to socioeconomic development in Vietnam.
5.2. Results for sub-question 2
Sub-question 2: What is level of VFM in using projects implementing the three targeted PPP
models?
In the world as a whole, a variety of sciences and international organizations have studied
about VFM in PPP model. The results of these researches show that there are a lot of factors that
influence on VFM. In which, three most important factors that support achieving VFM are reducing
lifecycle costs, effective risk allocation and social benefits.
On practice activities of infrastructure investment in term of BOT, BTO and BT schemes,
Vietnam government only focuses on increasing the number of the projects to utilize capital,
experiences and skills of private sector while VFM of the projects is low level. Actually, many
BOT, BTO and BT infrastructure projects in Vietnam have massive lifecycle costs because of costs
overrun and high transaction costs. In addition, lack of explicit identification and effective transfer
of risks for three targeted PPP projects in Vietnam, risks in the projects are allocated ineffectively.
Consequently, Vietnam government has to take most risks from PPP projects. According to
Vietnam Bridge and Road Association, 70-80% of the large transport
projects on BOT or BT schemes were distorted and government must pay huge money to buy these
projects again (Phung, 2011). Moreover, some projects in term of BOT scheme have benefit
conflicts between private investors and social. For example, in case of Binh Trieu 2 Bridge BOT
project, the final purpose of the project is that solving traffic congestion at gateway of Ho Chi Minh
City. However, when private investors set up charge station, there is considerable increase in traffic
congestion there (Thanh, 2011). As a result, local government has to purchase this project. To
summarize, Vietnam government only focuses on increasing quantity of three targeted PPP projects
while their quality is forgotten, especially VFM of the projects.
5.3. Results for sub-question 3
Sub-question 3: How should the Vietnamese government secure greater VFM in using the three
targeted PPP models in Vietnam?
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In fact, there are two big reasons why most of three targeted PPP projects in Vietnam are
low in VFM:
- Public sector does not have enough experiences and knowledge to co-operate with private
sector effectively. According to Lam Dong Department of Plan and Investment, government
authorities are not trained about implement three targeted PPP models fully and central government
does not issue comprehensive assessment reports about implemented BOT, BT and BTO projects.
Therefore, it is very difficult for government authorities to manage the projects in a long term
period. For example, government authorities can not identify all factors that have impacts on the
projects, especially estimate long-term inflation. As a result, they make old mistakes again or lead
to cost overrun in the projects. Even in negotiation stage, lack of experiences can make public
sector have wrong decisions that bring excessive profits for private investors as in case of
Co May Bridge BOT Project.
- In Vietnam, policies for BOT, BTO and BT projects are insufficient and unstable. As a
result, it raises risks in the projects and fear of private investors when they want to join in the
projects. Moreover, policies of Vietnam government do not require a comparison between PPP
models and traditional procedures. It means that government does not have a method to choose
projects that have high VFM. In addition, the policy framework also causes difficulties of public
sector in three targeted PPP projects, especially land acquisition process. Lam Dong Department of
Finance supports that public sector has to implement process of land acquisition in three targeted
PPP projects. This process actually faces with a big problem which is the non-cooperation of
people. Because price of provincial government is often lower than markets’ price, people do not
want to leave away from their houses. The problem will become more serious if the projects spread
in many provinces. The main reason is that each province has its own price policy of land
acquisition and weak relationship of government departments in Vietnam.
Obviously, if Vietnam government wants to secure greater VFM in using the three targeted
PPP models, it needs more innovations such as establishing organization as The SFT in Scotland,
building assessment process that is similar process of Korea, reforming administrative procedure to
improve transparency and reduce high transaction costs, building strong system of policies to
support implementing three targeted PPP models and learning experiences from nations that have a
lot of successful PPP projects with high VFM.
5.4. Results for sub-question 4
Sub-question 4: How and what should the Vietnamese government learn from the existing value for
money of the three main targeted models and other PPP models in other countries?
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In the world, The United Kingdom and Korea have a variety of successes in applying PPP
model with high VFM. Vietnam can research two innovated PPP models of The United Kingdom
namely the Non-Profit Distributing model and The Hub initiative. According to the Non-Profit
Distributing model, Vietnam can find out new versions of PPP model in which transaction costs are
reduced and limit excessive profits of private investors. There is a notice in The Hub initiative that
many local agencies and private sector actually cooperate to implement PPP projects as Hub
companies. As a result, local agencies will implement the projects more effectively because of not
only their duties but also their legitimate benefits. It leads to saving time and reducing transaction
costs considerably. In addition, the model of Scottish Futures Trust in Scotland can become good
benchmark for Vietnam to achieve VFM of PPP projects. Scottish Government established Scottish
Futures Trust in 2008.  Scottish Futures Trust is an independent company that includes staffs from
both public and private sector. The staffs of SFT are experts who have experience of working with
the private sector. This is solution for limited abilities of public officers in Vietnam.
The lesson from Korea is that it’s necessary to establish a specialized agency that provides
detailed and practical guidelines for implementing PPP projects with high VFM. Especially, it has
to make VFM test of all PPP projects and assess pre-feasibility study of them. After that, the results
of these processes are compared with public sector comparator test to decide whether projects
should be applied PPP model or not. As a result, PPP projects in Korea have optimal cost. This is a
good way to choose suitable investment method of Korea government.
6. Conclusions, recommendations and limitations
Main research question: How can the three targeted PPP models can be implemented more
effectively in terms of value for money in Vietnam?
Since the early 1990s until now, practices of three targeted PPP models in Vietnam shows
that government seems only to focus on how to improve more PPP projects while government
seems to forget their quality as VFM. VFM is influenced by a variety of factors within reducing
lifecycle cost, effective risk allocation and social benefits are most important. In fact, most BOT,
BTO and BT projects in Vietnam are unsuccessful and have low VFM. Obviously, Vietnam needs
to enhance VFM of infrastructure investments in term of three targeted PPP projects. The first
important thing is that government has to clearly understand and focus on VFM in implementation
of the projects. In addition, government should continue to innovating administrative procedures.
Vietnam has implemented simplification of administrative procedures through ‘Project 30’ that is
assessed at high level by OECD (Ross, 2011, p. 14). However, policies about application of BOT,
BTO and BT schemes are insufficient and change quickly. Therefore, government should
continuously innovate to improve strong policy system that makes more transparency and fair
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competition for private sector. This contributes to reduce in high transaction costs and enhancing
VFM. It is important to notice that government authorities do not have enough experiences to
implement BOT, BTO and BT contracts effectively. All these led to the fact that many projects
have been distorted and even failed. Therefore, government should establish an organization like
the SFT in Scotland to improve effectiveness of BOT, BTO and BT schemes. One more important
thing is that Vietnam should adapt from international experiences and study many successful
models of other countries in applying PPP model with high VFM. The lesson from The United
Kingdom can be considered as the model focusing on limiting excessive profits of private sector
and reducing transaction costs. Experiences of Korea show that government should establish a
specialized agency that provides detailed and practical guidelines for implementing PPP projects
with high VFM. Therefore, government officers should be joined more conferences and trained
abroad about application of PPP model, especially in The United Kingdom and Korea where reach
high VFM in PPP projects.
This research just investigates three most important factors that affect on VFM of three
targeted PPP projects in Vietnam so that it is not a comprehensive picture of VFM in PPP projects.
Therefore, it is necessary to study impact of other factors on VFM for improving VFM of three
targeted PPP projects in Vietnam. However, the results of this research are to enhance the
effectiveness of BOT, BTO and BT projects in Vietnam.
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Appendix 1 - Risk allocation matrix (Source: Q. Government, 2008, pp. 92-107)
Risk category Description Consequence Mitigation Likely
preferred
allocation
Site risks
The risk that the project land will be unavailable or unable to be used at the required time, in the
manner or at the cost anticipated, or that the site will generate unanticipated liabilities, with the result
that the contracted service delivery and/or projected revenues are adversely affected.
Acquisition of
Site
The risk that
preferred site is in
third-party
ownership and has to
be acquired for the
project.
The risk of
unanticipated
land acquisition
costs and delays
in acquisition.
State may use its
statutory powers of
compulsory
acquisition.
Private party
Existing
structure
(refurbishment/
extensions)
Risk that existing
structures are
inadequate to
support new
improvements.
Additional
construction
time and cost.
Private party will
pass to builder who
relies on expert
engineering reports.
Private party
Site conditions The risk that
unanticipated
adverse ground
conditions are
discovered which
cause construction
costs to increase
and/or cause
construction delays.
Additional
construction
time and cost.
Private party will
pass to builder which
relies on expert
testing and due
diligence. The
government may
commission initial
reports if appropriate
Private party
Approvals (1) The risk that
necessary approvals
may not be obtained
or may be obtained
only subject to
Delay in works
commencement
or completion
and cost
increases.
Where the project is
unusually complex or
the processes to
obtain the approvals
are likely to be
Private party
unless
government
assumes some or
all of risk due to
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unanticipated
conditions that have
adverse cost
consequences or
cause prolonged
delay
lengthy, the
government may
start the process of
obtaining approvals
prior to the
commencement of
the tender process.
The work done
would then
be transferred to the
Preferred Bidder
under a [Project
Development]
agreement to enable
them to obtain the
approval.  The
Bidders are
ultimately
responsible for
determining which
approvals are
necessary
complexity or
sensitivity of
particular project
Approvals (2) The risk that
additional approvals
required during the
course of the project
cannot be obtained.
Further project
development or
change in
business
operation may
be prevented
Private party to
anticipate
requirements.
Private party
unless
government has
initiated the
change requiring
approval.
Environmental
(1)
The risk that the
project site is
contaminated
requiring significant
expense to
Clean-up costs
and delay
Reliance on expert
reports and insurance
Private party
will
generally assume
the risk although
because of the
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remediate. time and cost
implications of
full due
diligence for
each Bidder,
some risk
sharing may be a
cost effective
solution.
Environmental
(2)
The risk that a site
chosen by the private
party (i.e. not the
government-
preferred site) is
contaminated
requiring significant
expense to
remediate.
Clean-up costs
and delay.
Reliance on expert
reports and insurance
Private party
assumes all risk
as it has selected
the site
Environmental
(3)
The risk that prior to
financial close offsite
pollution has been
caused from a
government
preferred site (any
site) to adjacent land.
Clean-up
liability
Government to
commission reports;
government should
also have greatest
knowledge of past
uses of its site.
Government
may
assume
responsibility by
way of
indemnity or
obligation to
compensate for
unidentified off
site pollution pre
financial close
Environmental
(4)
The risk that prior to
financial close offsite
pollution has been
caused from a non-
Clean up
liability
Private party should
commission reports
and investigations.
Private party
will take risk of
offsite pollution
from any site
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government
preferred site to
adjacent land.
that is not a
government
preferred site.
Environmental
(5)
The risk that after
financial close offsite
pollution is caused to
adjacent land.
Clean up
liability
Private party can
manage site activity.
Private party
will be in control
of activities on
the site post
financial
close and will be
required to
assume risk of
offsite pollution
caused by those
activities
Clean-up and
rehabilitation
The risk that the use
of the project site
over the contract
term has resulted in a
significant clean up
or rehabilitation
obligation to make
the site fit for future
anticipated use.
Financial
liability on
residual owner.
Private party able to
manage the use of
the asset and attend
to its maintenance
and refurbishment.
Private party to
take risk
(whether
government is to
resume or not)
and must
demonstrate
financial
capacity
or support to
deliver the site in
the state required
by government.
Native title The risk of costs and
delays in negotiating
indigenous land use
agreements where
project site may be
subject to Native
Delay and cost Search of registers
and enquiry if
appropriate and take
expert advice. Private
party must engage
with traditional
Government and
private party to
jointly manage
risk
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Title or risk
injunction and/or
invalidity of
approvals.
owners to establish
relationship over
whole of project life.
Government may
assist in progressing
procedures for native
title clearances in
early stages, and
where necessary
exercise available
compulsory
acquisition powers.
Cultural
heritage
The risk of costs and
delays associated
with archaeological
and cultural heritage
discoveries.
Delay and cost Search of registers
and enquiry if
appropriate and take
expert advice. Private
party must engage
with traditional
owners to establish
effective relationship
over whole of project
life. Government
may assist in
progressing
procedures for
Cultural
Heritage clearance in
early stages.
Government and
private party to
jointly manage
risk.
Availability of
site
The risk that
tenure/access to a
non-preferred site
that is not presently
owned by
Delay and cost Bidder’s obligation
to secure access prior
to contract signing.
Private party, as
it makes the
decision to bid
on a non-
preferred site.
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government or
private party cannot
be negotiated.
Design, construction and commissioning risk
The risk that the design, construction or commissioning of the facility or certain elements of each of
these processes, are carried out or not carried out in a way which results in adverse cost and/or
service delivery consequences. The consequences if the risk materialises may include delays and/or
cost increases in the design, construction and commissioning phases, or design or construction flaws
which may render the infrastructure inadequate for effective service delivery, either immediately or
over time.
Design The risk that the
design of the facility
is incapable of
delivering the
services at
anticipated cost.
Long term
increase in
recurrent costs -
possible long-
term
inadequacy of
service.
•  Private party may
pass risk to
builder/architects
and other
subcontractors while
maintaining primary
liability; and
• Government has the
right to abate service
charge payments
where the risk
eventuates and
results in a lack of
service – it may
ultimately result in
termination where
the problem cannot
be suitably remedied.
Private party
will be
responsible
except where an
express
government
mandated
change during
the design
and construction
phase has caused
the design defect
Construction The risk that events
occur during
construction that
prevent the facility
being delivered on
Delay and cost Private party
generally will enter
into a fixed term,
fixed price building
contract to pass the
Private party
will be liable
unless the event
is one for which
relief as to time
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time and on cost. risk to a builder with
the experience and
resources to
construct so as to
satisfy the private
party's obligations
under the contract
or cost or both is
specifically
granted under
the contract,
such as force
majeure or
government
intervention
during the
construction
phase.  Bank
may provide a
letter of credit,
which can be
drawn upon by
equity parties if
construction is
not completed.
Commissioning The risk that either
the physical or the
operational
commissioning tests
which are required to
be completed for the
provision of services
to commence, cannot
be successfully
completed
For the private
party and its
financiers -
delayed/lost
revenue.
For
government-
delayed service
commencement.
No payment by
government until all
physical and
operational
commissioning tests
have been
successfully
completed
Private party,
although
government will
assume an
obligation to
cooperate and
facilitate prompt
Public Sector
attendance on
commissioning
tests.
Technical
obsolescence
or innovation
The risk of the
contracted service
and its method of
delivery not keeping
Private party's
revenue may
fall below
projections
Private party may
arrange
contingency/reserve
fund to meet upgrade
Private party
except where
contingency is
anticipated and
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pace, from a
technological
perspective, with
competition and/or
public requirements.
either via loss
of demand (user
pays model)
payment
abatement
(availability
model) and/or
operating costs
increasing; for
government -
consequence
will be failure
to receive
contracted
service at
appropriate
quantity/quality
including
adverse effect
on core service
delivery in core
service model.
costs subject to
government
agreement as to
funding the reserve
and control of
reserve funds upon
default; also
monitoring
obligations in the
contract and work on
detailed, well-
researched output
specifications
(government) and
design solution
(private party).
government
agrees to share
risk possibly by
funding a
reserve
Sponsor and financial
The risk that:
- Where the sponsors are unable to fulfil their contractual obligations to government, government will
be unable to enforce those obligations against the sponsors or recover some form of compensation or
remedy from the sponsors for any loss sustained; or
- That the sponsors are for security or other probity reasons, inappropriate or unsuitable to be
involved in, or connected with, the delivery of a project, and in so being may harm the project or
bring it into disrepute.
Interest rates
pre-completion
The risk that prior to
completion interest
rates may move
Increased
project cost.
Interest rate hedging With private
party from the
date that it is
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adversely thereby
undermining bid
pricing.
reasonably likely
that a
partnership
agreement will
be entered into
such that a
hedging
instrument can
be used
Sponsor risk The risk that the
private party is:
•  Unable to provide
the required services
or becomes
insolvent;
•  Later found to be
an improper person
for involvement in
the provision of
these services; and
• Subject to financial
demands which
exceeds its or its
sponsors’ financial
capacity causing
corporate failure.
Cessation of
service to
government and
possible loss of
investment for
equity
providers.
•  Ensure project is
financially remote
from external
financial liabilities,
ensure adequacy of
finances under loan
facilities or sponsor
commitments
supported by
performance
guarantees;
• Use of non-
financial evaluation
criteria and due
diligence on private
parties (and their
sponsors).
• Project models to
be provided for
review in all cases.
Government
Financing
unavailable
The risk that when
debt and/or equity
are required by the
private party for the
No funding to
progress or
complete
construction.
Government requires
all bids to have fully
documented financial
commitments with
Private party
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project it is not
available then and in
the amounts and on
the conditions
anticipated.
minimal and easily
achievable
conditionality.
Further finance
due to changed
requirements of
government
The risk that the
government imposes
a requirement, by
reason of a change in
law, policy or other
similar event, which
is specifically
directed at the
project and results in
additional funding
being needed to
rebuild, alter, re-
equip, etc the facility
which cannot be
obtained by the
private party.
No funding
available to
complete
further works
required by
government.
•  Private party must
assume best
endeavours
obligation to fund at
agreed rate of return
with option
on government to
pay by way of uplift
in the services charge
over the balance of
the term or by a
separate
capital expenditure
payment;
• Government to
satisfy itself as to
likelihood of this
need arising, its
likely criticality if it
does arise, and as to
financial capacity of
private party to
provide required
funds and (if
appropriate) budget
allocation if
government itself is
required to fund it.
Government
takes the risk
that private
finance is
unavailable.
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Change in
ownership
The risk that a
change in ownership
or control of the
private party results
in a weakening in its
financial standing or
support or other
detriment to the
project
The financial
robustness of
the private party
may be
diminished and,
depending on
the type of
project, probity
and other non
financial risks
may arise from
a change in
ownership or
control which
may be
unacceptable to
government
Government
requirement for its
consent prior to any
change in control.
N.B. private party
will seek to limit this
control to
circumstances where
substantive issues are
of concern such as
financial capacity
and probity.
Government risk
as to the adverse
consequence of a
change if it
occurs; private
party risk that its
commercial
objectives may
be inhibited by a
restrictive
requirement for
government
consent to a
change.
Refinancing
benefit
The risk (upside) that
at completion or
other stage in project
development the
project finances can
be restructured to
materially reduce the
project's finance
costs.
A beneficial
change in the
financing cost
structure of the
project.
Government to
advise Bidders
during the
competitive bid
process of the
procedures for
sharing in
refinancing benefit.
Formula to be agreed
and documented in
project agreements.
Generally, the project
agreements will
provide for sharing
once the project
vehicles internal rate
Shared
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of return reaches an
agreed level.
Tax changes The risk that before
or after completion
the tax impost on the
private party, its
assets or on the
project will change.
A negative
effect on the
private party's
financial returns
and in extreme
cases, it may
undermine the
financial
structure of the
project so that it
cannot proceed
in that form.
The financial returns
of the private party
should be sufficient
to withstand such
change. The private
party should obtain a
private tax ruling in
relation to specific
taxation structures.
Private party
Operating
The risk that the process for delivering the contracted services – or an element of that process
(including the inputs used within or as part of that process) – will be affected in a way which prevents
the private party from delivering the contracted services according to the agreed specifications and/or
within the projected costs.
Inputs The risk that
required inputs cost
more than
anticipated, are of
inadequate quality or
are unavailable in
required quantities.
Cost increases
and in some
cases adverse
effect on quality
of service
output.
Private party may
manage through
long-term supply
contracts where
quality/quantity can
be assured; private
party can address to
some extent in its
facility design.
Private party
unless
government
provides inputs
Changes in
output
specification
outside agreed
specification
The risk that
government's output
requirements are
changed after
contract signing
A change in
output
requirements
prior to
commissioning
Government can
mitigate this risk to
an extent by
minimising the
chance of its
Government
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range whether pre or post
commissioning.
may necessitate
a design change
with capital cost
consequences
depending on
the significance
of the change
and its
proximity to
completion.
A change after
completion may
have a capital
cost
consequence or
a change in
recurrent costs
only; for
example where
an increase in
output
requirements
can be
accommodated
within existing
facility
capacity.
specifications
changing and, to the
extent they must
change, ensuring the
design is likely to
accommodate it at
least expense.
This will involve
considerable time
and effort in
specifying the
outputs up front and
planning likely
output requirements
over the term.
Alternatively, shorter
tem operating
contracts may be
utilised.
Operator
failure
The risk that a
subcontract operator
may fail financially
or may fail to
provide contracted
services to
The failure may
result in service
unavailability,
an inability for
government to
deliver core
Government will
carry out due
diligence on
principal
subcontractors for
probity and financial
Private party is
fully and
primarily liable
for all
obligations to
government
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specification. services and, in
each case, a
need to make
alternate
arrangements
for service
delivery with
corresponding
cost
consequences.
capacity and
commission a legal
review of the major
subcontracts
including the
guarantees or other
assurances taken by
the private party; if
failure does occur the
private party may
replace the operator
or government may
require operator
replacement.
irrespective of
whether it has
passed the risk to
a subcontractor.
Market risk
The risk that:
- Demand for a service will vary from that initially projected; or
- Price for a service will vary from that initially projected, so that the total revenue derived from the
project for the project term varies from initial expectations.
General
economic
downturn
In a user pays model,
the risk of a
reduction in
economic activity
affecting demand for
the contracted
service.
Revenue below
projections.
Where government is
the primary off-taker
the private party may
seek an availability
payment element;
otherwise the private
party will ensure
robust financial
structure and
sponsor/financier
support.
Private party
Competition In a user pays model
the risk of alternate
suppliers of the
Revenue below
projections
arising from a
Private party to
review likely
competition for
Private party
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contracted service
competing for
customers.
need to reduce
the price and/or
from a
reduction in
overall demand,
because of
increased
competition.
service and barriers
to entry.
The private party
may seek an
availability payment
element and/or may
seek compensation
for the impact of
government
subsidised
competition.
Demographic
change
The risk of a
demographic/socio-
economic change
affecting demand for
contracted service
Revenue below
projections
Party to review likely
competition for
service, barriers to
entry.
Private party may
seek an availability
payment element.
Private party
Inflation The risk that value of
payments received
during the term is
eroded by inflation.
Diminution in
real returns of
the private
party.
Private party seeks
an appropriate
mechanism to
maintain real value
e.g. via linkage to
CPI. Government
concern to ensure its
payments do not
overcompensate for
inflation and to avoid
any double payment
for after costs
adjustments e.g. on
changes in
policy/law.
Private party
takes risk on the
methodology
adopted to
maintain value.
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Network and interface
Network risk is the risk that the network(s) needed for the private party to deliver the contracted
services will be removed, not adequately maintained or otherwise changed – including being
extended to include additional infrastructure or services not foreseen or anticipated at the date of the
contract – in a way that either prevents or frustrates the delivery of the contracted services, affects the
quality of the specified outputs or in some other way affects the viability of the project.
Interface risk is the risk that the method or standard of delivery of the contracted services will prevent
or in some way frustrate the delivery of the core services or vice versa.
Withdrawal of
support
network
The risk that, where
the facility relies on
a complementary
government network,
that support is
withdrawn or varied
adversely affecting
the project.
Negative
patronage and
revenue
consequences.
Private party will
seek financial redress
against change which
unfairly
discriminates against
the project
particularly on a user
pays project where
revenue is directly
affected; under an
availability model
private party will
seek to avoid
abatement if
government
'prevention' is cause
of unavailability.
Private party
except where
government
initiates changes
that discriminate
against the
project.
Changes in
competitive
network
The risk that an
existing government
network is
extended/changed/re-
priced so as to
increase competition
for the facility.
Negative
patronage and
revenue
consequences.
Private party will
seek financial redress
against change that
unfairly
discriminates against
the project by
government
subsidising
Private party
except to the
extent that
government
provides redress
for appropriate,
discriminatory
changes.
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competition (existing
or new).
Interface (1) The risk that the
delivery of core
services occurs in a
way that is not
specified in the
contract adversely
affects the delivery
of contracted
services.
Adverse effect
on delivery of
contracted
service,
potential for
default by
private party
and possible
need for
government to
make other
arrangements
for service
provision.
Government
manages core service
activities allowing it
to influence the
materialisation of
interface risk and its
consequences
Private party
except to the
extent that
government
provides redress
for appropriate,
discriminatory
changes.
Interface (2) The risk that the
delivery of
contracted services
adversely affects the
delivery of core
services in a manner
not specified in the
contract.
Adverse effect
on delivery of
core services,
default by
private party
and possible
need for
government to
make other
arrangements
for core service
provision.
Private party
manages contracted
service activities
Private party
Industrial relations
The risk of any form of industrial action – including strikes, lockouts, work bans, work-to-rules,
blockades, picketing, go-slow action and stoppages – occurring in a way which directly or indirectly,
adversely affects commissioning, service delivery or the viability of the project
Industrial The risk of strikes, Cost and time Private party or its Private party
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relations and
civil
commotion
industrial action or
civil commotion
causing delay and
cost to the project.
delay. sub-contractors
manage project
delivery and
operations
Legislative and government policy
The risk that government will exercise its powers and immunities, including but not limited to, the
power to legislate and determine policy, in a way which negatively impacts on or disadvantages the
project.
Changes in
law/policy (1)
The risk of a change
in law/policy of the
state government
only, which could
not be anticipated at
contract signing and
which has adverse
capital expenditure
or operating cost
consequences for the
private party.
A material
increase in the
private party's
operating costs
and/or a
requirement to
carry out capital
works to
comply
with the change
• Government may
mitigate its liability
for such change by
monitoring and
limiting (where
appropriate) changes
which may have
these effects or
consequence on the
project and via
mechanisms in the
contract allowing
compensation only
above a pre-agreed
'Significant Amount'.
• Government may
also requiring the
private party to effect
the change in such a
manner that the
financial effect on
government is
minimised and, if
payment is required,
that payment is made
Government:
although the
parties may
share the
financial
consequences of
capital cost
increases in an
agreed way, for
example by the
private party
meeting a
percentage of the
cost up to a
specific limit
and government
meeting any
excess.
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in a way and a time
best suited to
government (e.g.,
pay on a progressive
scale).
• In a user pays
model, put in place a
regulatory regime
that allows pass
through to end-users.
Changes in
law/policy (2)
In some cases, the
risk of a change in
law/policy (at other
levels of
government) which
could not be
anticipated at
contract signing and
which causes a
marked increase in
capital costs and/or
has substantial
operating cost
consequences for the
private party.
Requirement on
the private party
to fund and
carry out capital
works or meet a
marked increase
in operating
costs to comply
with the change.
Government
mitigates by
excluding changes
such as tax changes
or changes for which
the private party is
compensated under a
CPI adjustment or
similar.
Private party
Regulation
Where there is a
statutory regulator
involved there are
pricing or other
changes imposed on
the private party
which do not reflect
its investment
Cost or revenue
effects
Private party to
assess regulatory
system and may
make appropriate
representations
Private party
79
expectations.
Force majeure
The risk that a specified event entirely outside the control of either party will occur and will result in
a delay or default by the private party in the performance of its contractual obligations.
Force majeure The risk that
inability to meet
contracted service
delivery (pre or post
completion) is
caused by reason of
force majeure events.
Loss or damage
to the asset,
service
discontinuity
for government
(may include
inability to
deliver core
service) and
loss of revenue
or delay in
revenue
commencement
for private
party.
• If insurable, private
party must ensure
availability of
insurance proceeds
towards repair of
asset and service
resumption and
government is to be
given the benefit of
insurance for service
disruption costs;
• Private party given
relief from
consequences of
service discontinuity;
• If uninsurable,
private party may
establish reserve
funding; and
• Government to
develop a
contingency plan for
alternate service
delivery.
- Private party
takes the risk of
loss or damage
to the asset and
loss of revenue.
- Government
takes some risk
of service
discontinuity
both as to
contracted
service and core
service subject
to insurance
availability and
will need to
arrange
alternative
service provision
the cost of which
will be met from
redirected
service payments
and (if insurable)
any shortfall
made up from
insurance
proceeds
Asset ownership
80
The risk that events such as loss events, technological change, construction of competing facilities or
premature obsolescence will occur, with the result that the economic value of the asset may vary,
either during or at the end of the contract term, from the value upon which the financial structure of
the project is based.
Maintenance
and
Refurbishment
The risk that design
and/or construction
quality is inadequate
resulting in higher
than anticipated
maintenance and
refurbishment costs
Cost increases
where private
party has
assured whole
of life
obligation and
adverse effect
on delivery of
contracted
services and a
corresponding
adverse effect
on government
ability to
deliver core
services.
Private party to
manage through long
term subcontracts
with suitably
qualified and
resourced sub-
contractors and
through formal or
informal consultation
processes with
government.
Private party
Technical
obsolescence
The risk that design
life of the facility
proves to be shorter
than anticipated
accelerating
refurbishment
expense.
Cost of upgrade Private party may
have recourse to
designer, builder or
their insurers
Private party, but
in certain high
technology
projects costs
may be
anticipated and
shared
Default and
termination
The risk of 'loss' of
the facility or other
assets upon the
premature
termination of lease
or other project
Loss of
investment of
private party;
possible service
disruption for
government.
• Private party (and
its debt financiers)
will be given cure
rights (time and
opportunity) to
remedy defaults by
- Private party
will take the risk
of loss of value
on termination.
- Government
assumes risk of
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contracts upon
breach by the private
party and without
adequate payment
the private party
which may lead to
termination;
• Serious breaches by
the private party to
lead to termination;
• Upon termination
the private party may
receive fair market
value less all
amounts due to
government;
• Government will
require step in rights
to ensure access and
service continuity
until control issues
are resolved.
disruption to
service.
Residual value
on transfer to
government
The risk that on
expiry or earlier
termination of the
services contract the
asset does not have
the value originally
estimated by
government at which
the private party
agreed to transfer it
to government.
Capital costs
incurred to
upgrade the
asset to the
agreed value
and useful life.
Government will
impose on the private
party maintenance
and refurbishment
obligations, ensure
an acceptable
maintenance
contractor is
responsible for the
work, commission
regular surveys and
inspections; it may
also direct funds
from the project into
dedicated controlled
Government
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sinking fund
accounts to
accumulate funds
sufficient to bring the
asset to agreed
condition and/or (if
required) obtain
performance bonds
to ensure the liability
is satisfied
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Appendix 2: Contents of Questionnaire
THE UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
INTERVIEW ABOUT VALUE FOR MONEY
OF THREE TARGETED PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS IN VIETNAM
The data from this interview is source for a research in University of Tampere, Finland. The
purpose of this interview is determining value for money and exploring difficulties to achieve VFM
in three target PPP models in Vietnam. All provided information is used for studying target.
Note: - Public-Private Partnership is called PPP.
- Three target PPP models are Build – Operate – Transfer (BOT), Build – Transfer –
Operate (BTO) and Build – Transfer (BT) schemes.
- Value for money is called VFM.
Part I: General Information
1. Organization:
2. Address of organization:
3. Office:
4. Respondent:
Part II: VFM in three targeted PPP projects
5. What is role of your organization in implementing a PPP project?
6. What are kinds of PPP schemes that you implemented?
7. In your opinion, what is VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
8. What do factors affect on VFM?
9. What are difficulties in implementing three targeted PPP projects?
10. In your opinion, what is the current level of VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
Part III: Recommendations of respondent
11. What should your organization do to improve VFM?
12. What are your recommendations for central government to enhance VFM?
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Appendix 3: Answers of Lam Dong Department of Transport
INTERVIEW ABOUT VALUE FOR MONEY
OF THREE TARGETED PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS IN VIETNAM
Part I: General Information
1. Organization: Lam Dong Department of Transport
2. Address of organization: No. 22 – Pasteur Street – Dalat City – Lam Dong Province - Vietnam
3. Office: Planning and Finance
4. Respondent: The vice- manager of this office
Part II: VFM in three targeted PPP projects
5. What is role of your organization in implementing a PPP project?
In fact, duty of my organization is that implementing investment infrastructure projects in
transport field in Lam Dong province. Some of them are PPP projects in which my organization
prepares bidding documents and implements feasibility study for each projects in this field.
Moreover, my agency has to monitor the works of private partners during lifecycle of the projects.
6. What are kinds of PPP schemes that you implemented?
Almost projects are implemented under BOT scheme. Moreover, my organization is
negotiating a BT project about building a bridge in Lam Dong province.
7. .What is VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
VFM means that the projects achieve economic effect. For example, because of choosing
bidder with possibly low cost, capital can be saved. In addition, the projects can contribute into
socio-economic development of the province.
8. What do factors affect on VFM?
In fact, there are two main factors such as competitive environment of bidding process and
inflation. On one hand, competition requires solutions that meet outcome specifications of the
projects with low cost. On the other hand, inflation leads to currency devaluations so that it makes
costs for the projects increasing over time. Especially, inflation of Vietnam is always at high level
in recent years. As a result, many projects can not complete on time and have cost overrun.
9. What are difficulties in implementing three targeted PPP projects?
When my organization builds feasibility study for a PPP projects, we do not have enough
abilities to determine all risks that relate to the projects. Moreover, under PPP model, this concern is
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more complex because of participation of private sector. In addition, government has not issued
general framework to manage risks lead to many difficulties in implementing the projects.
10. What is the current level of VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
VFM of PPP projects in Vietnam reach high average level because two main reasons. The
first reason is that bidding process will choose suitable bidder with lowest costs so that capital can
be saved. The second reason is that facilities from these projects have many contributions for
national economy.
Part III: Recommendations of respondent
11. What should your organization do to improve VFM?
1. Determining risks in scope of the infrastructure projects in transport field.
2. Training about implementing and monitoring PPP projects in transport field for officers
who participate into the projects directly.
12. What are your recommendations for central government to enhance VFM?
Government should build general framework of risk management in PPP projects. This
framework should include clear guides for three targeted PPP schemes such as BOT, BTO and BT
schemes. Actually, it is very useful for all local governments in Vietnam when they apply PPP
model.
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Appendix 4: Answers of Lam Dong Department of Planning and Investment
INTERVIEW ABOUT VALUE FOR MONEY
OF THREE TARGETED PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS IN VIETNAM
Part I: General Information
1. Organization: Lam Dong Department of Planning and Investment
2. Address of organization: No. 08 –Tran Hung Dao Street – Dalat City – Lam Dong Province -
Vietnam
3. Office: Basic construction and Appraisal
4. Respondent: Manager of this office
Part II: VFM in three targeted PPP projects
5. What is role of your organization in implementing a PPP project?
My organization has important role in calling investment, approving investment projects and
monitoring the implementing process of projects. These projects include PPP projects. Moreover,
we build middle-term strategic and annual plan about investment into infrastructure in Lam Dong
province. Specially, my organization supply investment licences for other organizations before they
implement projects, include PPP and other projects. Obviously, my organization play important role
in applying PPP model.
6. What are kinds of PPP schemes that you implemented?
Lam Dong province is often used two types of schemes such as BOT and BT. For example,
high way Lien Khuong BOT projects and general administrative area BOT project. Moreover,
transport field attracts most investment projects under PPP model in case of Lam Dong province.
7. .What is VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
VFM means that benefit of the projects is more than the costs that invest for them. Benefit
includes economic and social benefit. It means that the projects must save money, however they
must ensure benefit of end users.
8. What do factors affect on VFM?
Limited abilities of officers have negative impact on expected results of the projects. For
example, because of limited ability, officers approve a PPP project that brings more profit for
private partners than end users. Obviously, this project is not effective.
9. What are difficulties in implementing three targeted PPP projects?
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The duty of my organization is that considering and assessing feasibility studies for PPP
projects of other agencies in Lam Dong province. We can not understand clearly about all
characteristics of all different fields so that they can not determine all risks that relate to the
projects. Moreover, we have not trained about assessing, managing and monitoring PPP projects
fully.
10. What is the current level of VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
VFM of PPP projects is low level because almost the projects in Vietnam are not on time
and cost overrun. It means that benefit of end users is affected strongly while capital of these
projects increases considerably.
Part III: Recommendations of respondents
11. What should your organization do to improve VFM?
1. Shortening the approval process and time for giving investment licences.
2. Encouraging officers to improve their knowledge about PPP model
12. What are your recommendations for central government to enhance VFM?
Government should train for officers who participate into the projects. The program of
training should include knowledge about benefit-cost assessment and experiences of successful
projects in Vietnam and other countries.
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Appendix 5: Answers of Lam Dong Department of Finance
INTERVIEW ABOUT VALUE FOR MONEY
OF THREE TARGETED PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS IN VIETNAM
Part I: General Information
1. Organization: Lam Dong Department of Finance
2. Address of organization: No. 44A– Ho Tung Mau Street – Dalat City – Lam Dong Province -
Vietnam
3. Office: Investment
4. Respondent: Manager of this office
Part II: VFM in three targeted PPP projects
5. What is role of your organization in implementing a PPP project?
My organization manages policies of government about investment infrastructure in Lam
Dong province. These policies are legal basis for all government agencies to receive capital for
building feasibility studies of PPP projects. Moreover, it is capital for land acquisition that is large
and important. It can make time of implementing the projects delay.
6. What are kinds of PPP schemes that you implemented?
Almost the projects are under BOT schemes and some projects are applied BT schemes
7. .What is VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
VFM means that capital of the projects is used effective lead to they finish on time and meet
objectives of the projects.
8. What do factors affect on VFM?
Limited abilities of officers lead to low level of management the scale and complexity of the
projects. Besides that, if policies of government are unstable, it makes more difficulties in applying
PPP model.
9. What are difficulties in implementing three targeted PPP projects?
In fact, policies of Vietnam government about change quickly so that it is very hard to
attract private sector to invest. Because it does not ensure that their capital can return and they have
profits. Moreover, we meet many difficulties in process of land acquisition because reasons such as
differences policies between different provinces or un-cooperation of people.
10. What is the current level of VFM of three targeted PPP projects?
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VFM of PPP projects is low level because almost the projects in Vietnam are not on time
and cost overrun.
Part III: Recommendations of respondents
11. What should your organization do to improve VFM?
1. Building suitable prices of land acquisition.  The suitable prices approximate to market
prices that people accept easier. It means that time for land acquisition process is shortened and the
projects can finish on time.
2. Finding out solutions to improve policies of Lam Dong province for enhancing VFM in
PPP projects.
12. What are your recommendations for central government to enhance VFM?
Government should build effective policies about applying PPP model and these policies
should be stable in long-term period.
